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MITIGATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL & RULE OF LAW
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL
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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade increased emphasis has been placed on the role
that artificial intelligence (AI) will play in disrupting the practice of
law. Although considerable attention has been given to the practical
task of designing a computer to “think like a lawyer,” a number of
related issues merit further inquiry. Of these, the risks that AI presents
to the constitutionally protected procedural and substantive dimensions of justice deserve particular attention. In this Article, we consider
the public and private application of AI in the administration of justice
and the provision of legal services. We observe that the imposition of
AI in certain legal contexts and settings has the potential to silence
discourse between actors and agents, subvert the rule of law, and
directly and indirectly threaten constitutional rights. In substantiating
these observations, we begin in Part I by contextualizing recent developments in legal technology. Tracing the evolution of rule-based AI
approaches through to modern data-driven techniques, in Part II we
explore how AI systems have sought to represent law, drawing on the
domains of: (a) judicial interpretation and reasoning; (b) bargaining
and transacting; and (c) enforcement and compliance, and we illustrate
how these representations have been constrained by the AI approach
used. In Part III we assess the use of AI in legal services, focusing
specifically on implications that are posed in respect of the protection of
constitutional rights and adherence to the rule of law. Finally, in Part
IV we examine the pragmatic challenges that arise in balancing the
risks and rewards of AI technologies in the legal domain, and we
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consider the issues that should shape and that are likely to shape its
use. We conclude by proposing the development of a “rule of legal AI”
designed to solidify the shared values that ought to govern future
development in the field.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Context
For over five decades researchers have attempted to apply techniques from the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to computationally
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model aspects of legal decision-making. 1 These endeavors have led
to the creation of a variety of different systems within and outside of
academia, relatively few of which have managed to make the transition from the lab to the marketplace.2 However, over the last few years,
tools employing AI and designed to support legal task completion have
come to occupy an increasingly important role in public and private
legal services delivery. When combined with substantial growth in the
number of legal tech start-ups,3 recent trends in technology adoption
exhibit a new direction for a profession who as recently as 2016 were
accused of working practices largely unchanged since the time of
Charles Dickens.4
For those familiar with the propensity of technology to succumb
to reoccurring “hype cycles,” 5 recent developments may be easily
dismissed as a passing fad. For others, the influence of AI is not something that should be so easily disregarded; not at least without a more
involved examination of the potential consequences that arise when
such technologies are given free rein to “weave themselves into the
fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.” 6
Computer systems (particularly those charged with assisting decisionmaking) present as neutral and value-free, capable of enhancing
rather than detracting from the structural integrity of the legal system
by minimizing the risks of human error/discretion. 7 However, such
systems cannot be judged purely on design, without regard to the
seen and unforeseen consequences that arise in implementation.

5. See Vicky Harris, Artificial Intelligence and the Law - Innovation in a Laggard
Market?, 3 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 287, 287 (1992); Edwina L. Rissland et al., AI and Law: A
Fruitful Synergy, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 6 (2003) (discussing Mehl’s Automation
in the Legal World conference paper proposing the use of logic for information retrieval and
inference in 1958—only two years after the concept of AI was first defined by McCarthy).
6. Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: Out of the Research Laboratory and
into the Marketplace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 4 (1987) [hereinafter Susskind, Out of the Research
Labratory]; Philip Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, 30 INT’L REV. L.,
COMPUTERS, & TECH. 94, 99 (2016); Anja Oskamp & Marc Lauritsen, AI in Law Practice? So
Far, Not Much, 10 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 227, 227 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Stanford Codex Center for Legal Informatics, STANFORD CODEX,
http://techindex.law.stanford.edu (last visited July 1, 2017) (listing 713 entries in June 2017,
up from 557 entries recorded in Oct. 2016).
8. Michael Skapinker, Technology: Breaking the Law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c3a9347e-fdb4-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d) [https://perma.
cc/2CQQ-L72Y] (quoting Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind).
9. Gartner Inc., Gartner's 2016 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies Identifies Three
Key Trends That Organizations Must Track to Gain Competitive Advantage, GARTNER.COM
(Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3412017 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
10. Mark Weiser, The Computer for the 21st Century, 265 SCI. AM. 94, 94 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka et al., Accountability and Automation Bias, 52 INT’L J.
HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 701, 702 (2000) (discussing the potential for automation to reduce
error).
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Although AI systems have the potential to guard against human
failings (whether those failings relate to capability, efficiency, or selfcontrol), such tools fundamentally change how people approach their
work, how systems are organized and operated, and where accountability vests for mistakes.8 Where decisions involve matters of personal
freedom, liberty, or the exercise of rights and responsibilities—as is
the case in relation to civil and criminal law—the stakes are vastly
higher. Power—whether vested in man or machine—must be accompanied by a commensurate degree of accountability. The values of the
justice system that humans strive to uphold are the same values
against which AI technology must also be measured. Although
there has been considerable attention given to the technical issues of
designing a computer to “think like a lawyer,” there remains a need
for greater reflection as to the theoretical, jurisprudential, and philosophical consequences that accompany this achievement.
In this Article we address this gap, offering a framework by which
to understand the application of AI to law and a means by which to
assess the impact of this application. We commence in Part I with a
series of definitions that contextualize the analysis in the sections that
follow. Tracing the evolution of rule-based AI approaches through to
modern data-driven techniques, in Part II we explore how AI systems
have sought to represent law, drawing on the domains of: (a) judicial
interpretation and reasoning, (b) bargaining and transacting, and (c)
enforcement and compliance, and we illustrate how these representations have been constrained by the AI approach used. In Part III we
assess the use of AI in legal services, focusing specifically on implications that are posed in respect of the protection of constitutional rights
and adherence to the rule of law. Finally, in Part IV we examine the
pragmatic challenges that arise in balancing the risks and rewards
of AI technologies in the legal domain, and we consider the issues
that should shape, and are likely to shape, its use. We conclude by
proposing the development of a “rule of legal AI” designed to solidify
the shared values that ought to govern future development in the field.
We argue that law is a mechanism for balancing competing interests, providing the infrastructure within which those competing
interests exist and can be expressed and reconciled. We observe that
the imposition of AI in certain legal contexts and settings has the potential to silence discourse between actors and agents, subvert the rule
of law, and directly and indirectly threaten constitutional rights. We
see this threat as the product of a dualist assumption that it is possible
to represent the “law” using technology without that representation
being influenced or constrained by its enabling apparatus (technological or otherwise). We propose that understanding and making explicit
12. Id. at 701–02.
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the model of law being imposed by a particular form of AI is a critical
step. One that better positions us to deploy AI in a way that strengthens constitutional values, promotes adherence to the rule of law, and
more fairly distributes the associated risks and benefits of new technologies.
B. Definitions
For the purpose of the analysis that follows in Parts II, III, and IV,
it is necessary for us to clarify our terminology at the outset. In this
section we define our use of the terms “artificial intelligence,” “law,”
and the “rule of law,” and briefly outline the assumptions that inform
this use.
1. Artificial Intelligence
AI is a broad term incorporating activities involving the design
and development of machines, which mimic some of the cognitive functions of the human mind. Whilst AI commonly conjures up thoughts
of sentient machines, early experiments in the second half of the
20th century demonstrated the difficulty of replicating the (largely
unknown) operations of the human brain to produce “general intelligence.”9 Work within the field has since focused on the development of
systems that can perform tasks in relation to specific sub-domains of
intelligence, such as learning, problem solving, reasoning, gathering
and understanding knowledge, perception, and communication.
General AI requires more than the ability to perform a certain action
or series of actions. It requires a system to be capable of undertaking
decision-making or inference tasks in pursuit of multiple different
goals, by drawing on data received via a system of perception such
as a camera, sensor, and data packages transferred via networks,
keyboard, mice, or microphone.10 Importantly, AI is considered a moving target with a degree of ephemerality, or as Professor David Miller
describes, “whatever machines haven’t learned to do yet.”11
Symbolic approaches to AI development (exemplified by expert
systems, logic systems, and information retrieval systems) characterized much of the early work in the field.12 These approaches focused
13. John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417, 417–18
(1980).
14. STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 25–27 (3d ed. 2010).
15. Jim Dator, Artilectual Salutations, 6 J. FUTURE STUD. 87, 89 (2001) (citing Professor
David Miller, a robotics specialist at the International Space University and the University
of Oklahoma).
16. See, e.g., Michael Aikenhead, The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law, 12
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 32 (1996); Andrew Terrett, Neural
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on the representation of knowledge, with knowledge as to how to
reach a goal embedded within the design of the program. More recent
efforts have been directed towards sub-symbolic (or “data-driven”)
approaches such as machine learning, which create a representation
of knowledge or latent rules through modeling and analyzing data
using statistical methods. In contrast to symbolic approaches, rules
are not imposed at the outset deterministically, but are instead discovered (inferred) by mapping outcomes (the correct answer) as a function
of inputs (the “facts”). This permits the reverse engineering of rules
(which can later be transposed into rule based systems)13 that capture
how the world works in practice and also enables generalization—the
ability for systems to extrapolate from the knowledge they have
ingested to make predictions from inputs (combinations of data) never
before encountered.
For over three decades AI projects have attempted to understand
and model legal reasoning. Much of the 1980s was spent speculating
as to the possibility that rule-based systems would replace the work of
lawyers14 and some went so far as to argue that this would lead to superior results because “finding chains of consequences in laws, and
finding where laws contradict each other, are ideal tasks for computers
and are often done poorly by humans.”15 The idea that AI systems can
be designed to find chains of consequences in law is in principle quite
simple. However, in practice it requires an agreed interpretation of
what the law actually is—this is far from settled and debate as to how
it should be settled exposes longstanding tensions between divergent
strands of legal theory.
2. Law
Many theories have been offered in pursuit of explaining what the
law is—effectively attempting to make sense of what to some would
Networks—Towards Predictive Law Machines, 3 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 94, 110 (1995);
David R. Warner, Jr., A Neural Network-Based Law Machine: Initial Steps, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51, 53–54 (1992); Jürgen Hollatz, Analogy Making in Legal
Reasoning with Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 289, 290
(1999); Dan Hunter, Commercialising Legal Neural Networks, J. INFO., L. & TECH. at § 1
(1996); John Zeleznikow & Andrew Stranieri, The Split-Up System: Integrating Neural
Networks and Rule-Based Reasoning in the Legal Domain, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 185, 185 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Nicholas Frosst & Geoffrey Hinton, Distilling a Neural Network Into a Soft
Decision Tree, in CEX WORKSHOP AT AI*IA 2017 CONFERENCE at § 7 (2017); Qinglong Wang
et al., A Comparative Study of Rule Extraction for Recurrent Neural Networks, CORNELL U.
ARXIV (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05420.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6ZM-FNVM].
18. E.g., Graham Greenleaf, Legal Expert Systems—Robot Lawyers? An Introduction to
Knowledge-Based Applications to Law, in AUSTRALIAN LEGAL CONVENTION at § 1–5 (1989);
Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, supra note 2, at 94.
19. DONALD MICHIE & RORY JOHNSTON, THE CREATIVE COMPUTER: MACHINE
INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 54 (1st ed. 1984).
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appear as an incoherent patchwork of rights and duties. Efforts to
explain “law” often represent it as: the product of a socially accepted
process, the proclamations of a sovereign entity, judicial decisionmaking,16 the normative expectations held by society as to appropriate
behavior, 17 and/or, commands backed by threat. 18 Within this
contested space, distilling the complexity of law into a framework
for understanding is not an easy task.
Unifying differing explanations inevitably lead us down the path of
legal pluralism, in which it is accepted that one or more valid explanations might exist and even interact.19 On this view, law may be seen
as a contestable construct that emerges from the action and reaction
between agents and (formal and informal, internal and external,
normative and non-normative) structures, existing not just a system
of rules intended to control behavior but a system by which to enable
access to fair outcomes. For the purposes of this Paper, we take this
pluralistic perspective as our starting point. This provides a framework against which we can map the intersection points between
AI and the creation, interpretation, application, and enforcement of
law as these relate to: (i) judicial decision-making and reasoning, (ii)
private bargaining and transacting, and (iii) public enforcement and
private compliance.
The legal processes, relationships, rules, and obligations that arise
in respect of each of these domains of activity are governed by a theory
of order, understood as the “rule of law.” This term embodies the

20. Roscoe Pound, Theories of Law, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 114–16 (1912–1913) [hereinafter
Pound, Theories of Law]; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1st ed. 1996) [hereinafter Leiter,
Legal Realism].
21. EUGEN EHRLICH & WALTER LEWIS, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW 24 (2001). Ehrlich notes: “it is not an essential element of the concept of law that it
be created by the state, nor that it constitute the basis for the decisions of the courts or other
tribunals . . .” Id. Normative legal interpretation is an expression of Durkheim’s ‘collective
consciousness’—the beliefs and sentiments universal to a people within society. See also
ÉMILE DURKHEIM & W. D. HALLS, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY xix (1997).
22. Austin’s command theory perceives law as command backed by threat or sanction—
a view in which both the command and the threat are integral criteria for something to be
considered “law.” Sandra Raponi, Is Coercion Necessary for Law? The Role of Coercion in
International and Domestic Law, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 35, 41–43 (2015). Hart offers an
alternative position, with the view that enforcement is self-generating: compliance derives
from a perception that one is under an obligation to obey rules, leading to social acceptance
of rules as constraints upon behavior. Id. at 43–46. For a concise overview of Hart and Austin
on enforcement, see id. at 41–46.
23. Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices:
Theories, Critiques, and Praxiological Re-specification, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 296, 297
(2007); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L.
1, 5 (1986).
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constraints that guard against the arbitrary exercise of power and
which enable justice to operate in a manner consistent with the
principles of liberal democracy.20
3. The “Rule of Law”
Exclusive rights, such as the authority to make new formal laws,
are bestowed upon only some members of society. These rights amount
to a transfer of power that cannot be given without restraint. Governance is therefore subject to the “rule of law,” which demands that “the
making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively
stable general rules”21 that promote equality, fairness, predictability,
transparency, and accessibility.22 When taken in conjunction with the
absence of corruption and the existence of democratic accountability,
the rule of law forms part of a critical triumvirate23 where it is seen as
the “lynchpin for stable government,” and “part of the universal duty
incumbent on all humanity.”24
The view of the “rule of law as the law of rules” implies both a
constraint on behavior as well as an aspirational framework. As a
theory of order rather than of law, adherence to the rule of law does
not presuppose a particular outcome, but does govern the process of
arriving at that outcome.25 This is not to say that the scope or purpose
of the “rule of law” is agreed—“[l]egal philosophers advance highly
nuanced analyses of the rule of law and its contours,”26 and to this,
public agencies often add their own interpretations that focus on

24. Randy E. Barnett, Can Justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 597, 622–23 (1988) (discussing the relationship between power and the rule of
law); Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 84–85 (2007) (discussing the
rule of law generally).
25. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213 (1979).
26. Bingham, supra note 20, at 5. It should be noted that various authors have sought
to describe the “rule of law” in slightly different ways. See, e.g., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
F.A. HAYEK, VOL. XVII: THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION (Ronald
Hamowy ed., 2011); Raz, supra note 21, at 213; Noel Cox, Editorial: The Rule of Law as the
Product of the Interplay between Potentially Conflicting Conceptions, 101 ROUND TABLE 299–
302 (2012); Michael L Principe, Albert Venn Dicey and the Principles of the Rule of Law: Is
Justice Blind? A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Great Britain, 22 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 357, 371 (2000); ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202–03 (1982).
27. Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other
Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECO. 659, 663 (2007).
28. Cox, supra note 22, at 299.
29. Noel B. Reynolds, Legal Theory and the Rule of Law, NEWSL. PHIL. & L. (Am. Philos.
Ass’n Newark, DE), Spring 2002, at 119.
30. Licht et al., supra note 23, at 663–64.
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dimensions of policy or economic development. 27 Notwithstanding
these differing views (a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope
of this Paper), the rule of law is generally said to prioritize a number
of key features, included among which are: stable and prospective
rules, an independent judiciary, limits on discretion, observance of the
principles of natural justice, accessible courts, and the constraint of
power/authority.28
In the United States, the principles enshrined in the rule of law find
formal expression via the written constitution (and accompanying
amendments) which operates to limit government, impose checks and
balances, ensure the separation of powers, and guarantee citizens
basic rights, such as equal protection and due process. The principles
and values at the heart of the rule of law and in respect of which
the constitution is silent, also find expression informally outside of a
constitutional framework, via statute, common law, and norms of
behavior. In jurisdictions where a codified constitution does not exist,
such as the United Kingdom, this model of informal expression has
given rise to what is known as an “unwritten constitution.”29 For the
purposes of the forthcoming analysis, we use “rule of law” to refer to
both of these formal and informal expressions so as to accommodate
the varying degrees of formality by which they are recognized in
various jurisdictions.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW MACHINES
Amplified by claims that vast parts of the legal profession can be
turned over to machines, the potential of AI and machine learning (ML)
in law has been met with both enthusiasm and existential anxiety.30
Yet for these claims to be plausible, it must be possible for a computer
to replicate dimensions of “human legal intelligence.” In this section
we examine the development of “law machines” in relation to the
creation, interpretation, application, and enforcement of law, examining three key areas where progress has been focused: (1) judicial

31. See, e.g., What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, https://
worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law (last visited Jan. 19, 2018)
(explaining that the UN, advances a human-rights centric definition as compared to the
World Justice Project).
32. See, e.g., Greenleaf, supra note 22, at § 1–5; Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Expert System, supra note 2, at 94.
33. John Baker, The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL
L.J. 4, 19 (2013).
34. See, e.g., Chris Weller, Law Firms of the Future Will be Filled with Robot
Lawyers, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 7, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/law-firms-are-starting-to-use-robot-lawyers-2016-7); James O’Toole, Here Come the
Robot Lawyers, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:16 AM), https://money.cnn.com/
2014/03/28/technology/innovation/robot-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/7U4A-Z3K7].
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interpretation and reasoning, (2) private bargaining and transacting,
and (3) public enforcement and private regulatory compliance.
A. Judicial Interpretation & Reasoning
Much of the work of lawyers in the field of litigation is directed at
predicting what a court might decide when interpreting the law, or
when applying the law to a particular factual scenario.31 Whilst it is
not possible to know with absolute certainty how it is that judges reason, a number of theories have been offered.32 These describe legal reasoning as the analysis of legal rules enshrined in legal sources using
methods that are: logical and deductive; analogical and comparative;
or subjective and discretionary, and these approaches to explaining
reasoning have underpinned the development of a range of different
AI systems intended to replicate the process of legal interpretation.
1. Rules & Rule-Based Systems
For formalists, the role of the judge is not to make law but rather
to bring clarity to the existing law (whatever its source) by engaging
in textual analysis to understand the plain meaning of the words
intended to bring that law into effect. Thus, legal reasoning (and
the laws elucidated through this process) is borne out of logical
deduction in which conclusions necessarily follow from the premises.
For example:
If A, then B
A∴B

The internal logic of the proposition is valid: it holds true no matter
what the values of A and B.
If the law is interpreted in the way that the formalists propose,
then the task of the judge is merely to apply the appropriate rules of
interpretation. The law is largely stable, and discretion is limited.
Given the same inputs (legislation, existing cases, a contract), same
training (and legal education is broadly consistent within jurisdictions), and task (interpreting the meaning of a particular source) it
should be possible for a legal professional to anticipate the likely
35. Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67
FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2015).
36. E.g., E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence, 34 LOY. L.
REV. 287, 287 (1988); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY
(2003); STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (3d ed. 2007)
(an introductory book meant to teach law students how to mimic the legal analysis used by
judges and lawyers); Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and
Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2003); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501 (1948); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1138 (1999).
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interpretation a judge will reach. When cast in this light, the law is
the product of an objective, detached reasoning process, in which fixed
rules are applied to source materials.
This being the case, it is not difficult to see how one might develop
a rule-based system that simulates deductive reasoning (if A then B,
if B then C, ∴ if A then C). The development of logic programming
languages in the 1980s made this possible, for unlike procedural
languages in which variables and relationships had to be defined in
advance, logic programming (implemented using languages such as
Prolog) permitted inferences to be drawn by setting a series of logic
conditions. These conditions form the attributes a solution must
possess, rather than the steps that must be taken to achieve a solution.
Through a computational process called unification, the system
identifies all possible solutions capable of satisfying underlying logic.
An example of this process is detailed in Figure 1.
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In procedural programming ‘Who’ could not equal ‘bob’, unless Who = ‘bob’ had been
previously specified within the system. In logic programming it is possible to pass in
uninstantiated arguments such as ‘Who’. Via a process called ‘unification’, the interpreter
will attempt to deduce what ‘Who’ should equal using previously defined rules/clauses. 33
This process is shown below.
Prolog Clause
1. Lawyer (john)
2. Lawyer (james)
3. Colleagues (john, mary)
4. Colleagues (james, mary)
5. Colleagues (susan, x) <- Lawyer (x) &
Colleagues (x, mary)
Query
I. Colleagues (susan, james)?
II. -? Colleagues (james, Who)

Meaning
John is a Lawyer
James is a Lawyer
John and Mary are colleagues
James and Mary are colleagues
Susan works with any Lawyer that
works with Mary
Meaning
Are Susan and James colleagues?
Who is a colleague of James?

QUERY:

‘colleagues (susan, james)?’

GOAL 1:

Match ‘colleagues’ on the left side of any clauses, preceding the
parenthesis.
Clause 3, 4 and 5

MATCHED:
GOAL 2:
MATCHED
GOAL 3:
MATCHED
OUTPUT:

‘susan’ and ‘james’ in the correct ordered position within the
parenthesis for clauses 3, 4 and 5.
Clause 5 – ‘susan’ is in the correct position & ‘james’ matches ‘x’
(which denotes ‘anyone’).
Match the right side of Clause 5 – ‘Lawyer (james) & Colleagues
(james, mary)’
Lawyer (james) is proven by Clause 2 and Colleagues (james,
mary) is proven by Clause 4.
Colleagues (susan, james)? = TRUE

Similarly, the query ‘-? Colleagues (james, Who)’ would match ‘Colleagues’ first, and then
seek to match james in the first position in the open parenthesis. As clause 4 matches the
query ‘Colleagues (James, ) the system would return the value Who = mary.

Figure 1. Logic Programming: An Example Using Prolog

The development of rule-based systems involved experts in various
domains attempting to distill their reasoning processes into a chain
of deductive logic, in which the conclusions follow from the premise
(“modus ponens”).34 This logic was replicated computationally with a
knowledge base (a set of facts) and a rules-engine (a set of rules that
describes what role the facts have on an outcome, e.g., IF, THEN).
These symbolic logic approaches, initially implemented using Prolog,
were, according to some, very suitable in law, owing to the fact that
“the law is well documented; its provisions are written down, and
33. ALLEN HUSTLER, PROGRAMMING LAW IN LOGIC, RESEARCH REPORT CS-82-13
(Department of Computer Science ed., 1982).
38. E.g., Lashbrooke, supra note 23, at 304.
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where they are not, decisions in previous cases are recorded for future
reference.”35 This led one group of scholars to develop the British Nationality Act System—among the first efforts to translate legal reasoning into an expert system.36 Developed in 1986, the program formalized 150 rules associated with the obtainment of British citizenship.37
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the logic applied in the program
and the (lay) translation of statute to logic, demonstrating how cascading rules guide a determination of entitlement to citizenship.
Table 1. British Nationality Act Program—Sample Rules & Logic38
Statute
(1)

A person born in the
United Kingdom after
commencement shall be
a British citizen if at the
time of the birth his
father or mother is –
(a) a British citizen; or
(b) settled in the UK.

Sub-Rules

Logic

[A] X acquires British Citizenship
by section 1.1

A is true if [B and
C and D and [E or
F]] are true.

[B] X is born in the UK at T (Time)
[C] T is after commencement of the
Act
[D] Y is parent of X
[E] Y is a British citizen at T
[F] Y is settled in the UK at T

The use of logic programming to emulate aspects of legal reasoning
was, at least initially, met with enthusiasm39 and following the British
Nationality Act System, a number of other prototypes were developed
in academia and industry in North America, the UK, and Europe.40
Explaining the enthusiasm surrounding symbolic approaches, Hunter
observed that these approaches were fairly easy for lawyers to understand and fitted into the existing normative pedagogical framework,
because “law schools teach law as a type of symbolic manipulation, and
some go so far as to introduce classes on logic and argument.”41 Others
39. M. J. Sergot et al., The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, 29 COMM. ACM
370, 383 (1986).
40. Id.; Edwina Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model
of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1967–68 (1990) (discussing the evolution of expert
systems and situating BNA as one of the first expert systems in law).
41. Id.
42. Kowalski, supra note 14, § 2.1.
43. With respect to enthusiasm, see Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A
Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence And Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV.
168, 168 (1986) [hereinafter Susskind, A Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence
And Legal Reasoning]; MICHIE & JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 54. For a more critical view
of developments at the time and afterwards, see Greenleaf, supra note 14, § 1–5; Leith, The
Rise and Fall of the Legal Expert System, supra note 2, at 100.
44. Susskind, Out Of The Research Laboratory, supra note 2, at 1–8; Richard E.
Susskind, The Latent Damage System: A Jurisprudential Analysis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 23, 23–24 (1989).
45. Dan Hunter, Looking For Law In All The Wrong Places: Legal Theory and Legal
Neural Networks, in JURIX : THE FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS (1994).
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(notably Leith) urged caution in overstating the potential of expert/logic systems in law and underestimating the challenges.42
Whilst logic systems such as Prolog enabled the development of AI
software, they were considered by some to be unsuitable for knowledge
representation.43 Further, criticism was directed at both the practicality and desirability of what was derisively referred to as “mechanical
jurisprudence”44—translating legal reasoning to mere symbol manipulation,45 and the very “notion of a clear rule [of interpretation] which . . .
[judges] can apply without further thought.”46 These criticisms arose
from recognition that in the real world A and B take on different values,
and A ∴ B can easily fail as a result of simplicity.47 These views sought
to counterbalance the claims made by others that progress in the field
was held back by an absence of legal knowledge engineers, or a lack
of understanding of the nature of law and legal reasoning.48 Instead,
the problems were said to stem from the fact that the law and legal
reasoning are contested rather than settled concepts. Systematizing
one particular model of interpretation amounts to the imposition of
certain assumptions about the law that were not—nor are they now—
universally agreed upon.
The real world limitations of simple deduction are easily seen in
practice. Take for instance, the following example provided by Article
I, Section 5, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Neither
House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the [prior]
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”49 This
could be translated into a logic statement as follows:
House of Representatives adjourns for more than three days without the consent of the Senate
∴ House of Representatives has acted unconstitutionally

Here the conclusion follows from the premise in terms of the
internal logic, but this logic does not illuminate what constitutes
“[prior consent],” or “adjournment.” Further, what is simple is not
necessarily correct; the logic statement does not explain whether
46. Philip Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 334,
356 (1984); Philip Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, 29 COMPUTER
J. 545, 545 (1986).
47. Thomas F. Gordon, Some Problems with Prolog as a Knowledge Representation
Language for Legal Expert Systems, 3 INT’L REV. LAW, COMP. & TECH. 1, 52 (1987).
48. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 623 (1908).
49. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 42, at 545.
50. Id. at 547.
51. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 339.
52. Susskind, Out Of The Research Laboratory, supra note 2, at 2.
53. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 5, cl. 4.
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“[prior] consent” is intended to qualify: (a) adjournments longer than
three days or adjournments to another place, or (b) adjournments to
another place that exceed three days in duration.
Expert systems addressed these issues though processes such as
backtracking, which allows chains of reasoning enabled rules to be
used in a definitional manner.50 When applied in practice, this results
in an increasingly complex set of linked rules, nudging us closer to a
definition for each vague term and syntactical ambiguity that exists.
However, whilst such an approach may be effective in respect of the
vast majority of cases where definitions are settled (what Hart
referred to as the “hardcore of standard”), those which arguably are
less likely to support differing interpretations (whether pernicious or
genuine), what of the “penumbra” in which interpretation is required:
how is it that “hard cases” are handled? 51 Where the definitional
quality of rules become exhausted, the practical limitations of this
form of deductive reasoning, and the difficulty associated with the
indeterminacy of language and the (often deliberate) vagueness of
legal language are brought into focus.52
Admittedly, these challenges have not gone ignored. The limitations of deductive rules of interpretation as described above formed
the focus of Gardner’s early work conducted at Stanford, looking at
what happens when the rules run out, and leading her to develop a
computational model capable of distinguishing between hard and
easy cases.53 Developers since have also attempted to accommodate
the non-fixed and open-texture nature of law in a range of different
ways, including taking cues from expert judgment,54 deferring to the
user,55 conceptual models, and fuzzy logic.56 McCarthy’s US Taxman
54. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 351.
55. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
56. Paul Conway, Syntactic Ambiguity, L. & JUST. FOUND. NSW, Mar. 14, 2002, at 35–
37. In relation to pernicious ambiguity, see Lawrence Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in
Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 860–63 (2004).
57. ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL
REASONING 14–16 (1987).
58. Susskind, A Jurisprudential Approach To Artificial Intelligence And Legal
Reasoning, supra note 39, at 176.
59. T.J.M. Bench-Capon, Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW 37, 40 (1989); Greenleaf, supra note 14, at 9.
60. Classical logic has it that an object is either part of a class (= 1) or not part of a class
(= 0). Fuzzy logic avoids this demarcation, proposing that an object can be part of a class to
a certain degree (between 0 and 1). This allows us to represent imprecise concepts and
handle uncertain or incomplete information. Ambiguous and overlapping concepts like
“short,” “medium,” and “long” can be represented in fuzzy logic sets, allowing us to take
account of the lack of definitiveness of the concepts. See Trevor Bench-Capon, Neural
Networks and Open Texture, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
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project, for example, “proposed a prototype-plus-deformation model for
representing ambiguous terms. The prototype [element] stor[ed] the
default meaning,” whilst the deformations were structured, mapped
synonyms.57 Nevertheless, where definitions are not settled, or ambiguity or vagueness arises, developers find themselves having to make
determinations about the law that may not reflect its machinations
in the real world. Such systems must also incorporate the ancillary
contextual or cultural knowledge that acts to inform the legal rules
governing a situation.58
These challenges are not unique to law. Encoding the ability of
clinicians to perform general reasoning on the basis of previously
unseen combinations of patient characteristics or symptoms has also
thwarted the progress of logic systems in medicine.59 To some degree
these issues can be avoided in law, though not without bringing new
challenges to the fore. For example, imposing a particular interpretation can be avoided by deferring to the judgment of the user, allowing
the user to make a call as to whether the conditions for a certain
definition have been met. Yet, deferring to the user risks creating a
system that conceptually maps legal reasoning, but does not perform
it. Conversely, enshrining the expertise (and the judgment) of a lawyer
within the system ascribes this expertise a level of definitiveness and
authority that conflicts with the way in which expertise is brought to
bear in reality. Lawyers advocate for an interpretation that best serves
their client, relying on axioms (knowledge of some previous truth),
induction, and/or deduction to justify this conclusion. Disputes arise
because experts are able to justify competing logical interpretations,
and therefore expert systems must do more than just provide a heuristic answer. Instead, they must search the solution space to corral
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 292, 292 (1993); see also Hollatz, supra note 12, at
289–300 (providing useful exploration of fuzzy logic in respect of German jurisprudence);
Célia Da Costa Peia et al., Combining Fuzzy Logic and Formal Argumentation for Legal
Interpretation, 10 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 49, 55–58 (2017) (providing an implementation example).
61. Seth R. Goldman et al., Precedent-Based Legal Reasoning and Knowledge
Acquisition in Contract Law: A Process Model, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 210, 220 (1987) (demonstrating that in
ascertaining whether a simple contract exists knowledge of social roles, knowledge of idioms
and an understanding of the notion of “promise” and of the meaning of “agreement” is
required.); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888 (1977).
58. Goldman et al., supra note 57, at 211.
59. Peter Szolovits, Artificial Intelligence and Medicine, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
IN MEDICINE 16 (Peter Szolovits ed., 1982) (exemplifying this challenge with the following
hypothetical: a doctor hears that a patient, who they know works in a feed store, is
experiencing upper body pain; the doctor may naturally expect the pain to be caused
by heavy-lifting while working, while an AI agent may not have access to this external
information, or may be unable to deduce when an occupation may have a medical impact by
hard-coded rules).
ON
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all possible answers and from this present an argument for each that
undermines opposing positions and strengthens the position of the
answer in focus. 60 In this regard, law shares some of the strategic
elements of games, such as chess; yet unlike chess, in law the range
of possible moves and the rules governing these moves are not static
or fixed, as the body of case law makes clear.
2. Precedent & Case-Based Systems
In the face of competing interpretations, it is argued that judges
must have recourse to other forms of reasoning.61 Within an adversarial system based on precedent, determining whether an A is a B also
demands analogical/inductive logic in which opposing yet plausible
interpretations are reconciled with reference to past cases, as follows:
Case c1 is similar to Case c2
Proposition p is true in case C1
∴ p is true in c2.

In order to automate comparative and analogical reasoning
processes, a system must operationalize the concept of “similarity
between cases”—determining whether a case fits within a particular
class by exploring the factors (key issues) on which a decision of
similarity is said to turn. It is not just the existence of similarity of
factors, but the polarity (favoring a plaintiff/favoring a defendant) of
factors that matter.62 Similarity speaks to individual factors, as well
as to case outcomes as a whole. The following example helps illustrate
the point.
In U.S. Trademark Law, “consumer confusion” represents a central
consideration for the court in determining whether trademark infringement has occurred.63 In establishing whether “consumer confusion” exists or is likely to arise, a district court must conduct a
multifactor analysis based on the factors set out by that circuit.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the multifactor test is intended “as
a heuristic device to assist in determining whether confusion exists.”64
60. KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS
3 (2017).
61. Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 2, 352–56 (discussing
the relevance of inductive and analogical reasoning); Leith, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Expert System, supra note 2, at 101–03.
62. Id. at 76.
63. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006) ("The overriding question in most federal
trademark infringement litigation is a simple one: is the defendant’s trademark, because of
its similarity to the plaintiff’s trademark, causing or likely to cause consumer confusion as
to the true source of the defendant’s goods?").
64. Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2004).
FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
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Each circuit has gone on to adumbrate its own formulation of the test,
so whilst the Federal Circuit draws on thirteen factors, other circuits,
such as the Second, use only eight. 65 In determining whether the
defendant's trademark is causing or likely to cause consumer confusion as to the true source of the defendant's goods, the Second Circuit
has identified eight factors of importance:66
•

The Strength of the Plaintiff's Mark (F1);

•

The Similarity of Plaintiff's and Defendant's Marks (F2);

•

The Proximity of Plaintiff's and Defendant's Products (F3);

•

The Likelihood That One of the Parties Will Bridge the Gap
(F4);

•

Evidence of Actual Confusion (F5);

•

Defendant's Intent (F6);

•

The Quality of Defendant's Goods (F7);

•

The Sophistication of the Consumers (F8).

Courts have also advised that the correct approach to analyzing
these variables and likelihood of confusion as a whole is to adopt a
“global appreciation” of all relevant factors and the contribution
they might make to confusion, treating them as interdependent in
the sense that a lesser degree of similarity of one factor may be
compensated for by a greater degree of similarity of the other(s).67 This
permits analysis in respect of outcomes for individual factors, and
analysis in respect of the case outcome as a whole.
Firstly, it is possible to analogize between cases on the basis of
the specific sub-factors (e.g., F1–F8) to deduce what has led to a
conclusion of confusion in previous cases and what that might mean
in the context of a new dispute. However, this is more complex
than might be assumed. That courts have previously found that
the marks “PROZAC” and “HERBROZAC”68 demonstrate similarity,
but that “POLAROID” and “POLARAD” 69 do not demonstrate

65. Beebe, supra note 63, at 1582–83 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
66. Polarad, 287 F.2d at 495.
67. See, e.g., Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002);
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2004); Shakespeare
Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am. Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1997); Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 228 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995).
68. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000).
69. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
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similarity, suggests that a finding of similarity of marks is not merely
a matter of the linguistic “edit distance” between the marks.70
It is then also possible to ascertain how the combination of factors
(F1–F8) contribute to the overall outcome. However, the factors are
interdependent and do not contribute an equal weight to an overall
finding in favor of the Plaintiff (P) or Defendant (D). That is to say that
a strong finding in favor of a plaintiff with respect to one factor may
compensate for the fact that many other factors were found in favor of
the defendant. Outcomes are not cumulative, nor have lawyers been
said to think in this way. As Ashley and Rissland explain: “Experts in
domains like the law simply do not reason in terms of weighting
schemes. In fact[,] in the legal domain, any reasoner that based an
opinion or course of action upon a purely numerical scheme would be
highly suspect.”71
As a result, it is not possible to conclude that a case win is simply
the product of more factors being found in favor of the plaintiff then
being found in favor of the defendant. Analogizing between cases may
instead mean exploring overlaps between cases on the basis of factors,
as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Likelihood of Confusion (F1–F8)
Factor Overlap for Three Second Circuit Likelihood of Confusion Cases.

70. A measure of difference computed with reference to the number of operations
required to transform one word into another. See DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN,
SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING § 3.11 (2d ed. 2009).
71. Kevin D. Ashley & Edwina L. Rissland, Waiting on Weighting: A Symbolic Least
Commitment Approach, in AAAI PROCEEDINGS 239, 239 (1988).
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Figure 272 draws together overlaps between three cases decided in
the Southern District of New York in accordance with Second Circuit
precedent: Playtex Products v. Georgia-Pacific Inc.,73 Madison Avenue
Caviarteria, Inc. v. Caviaria.com, 74 and Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape
Finds at Dupont, Inc.75 It reveals most obviously in regards to Playtex
Products, that decisions are not made simply by counting the number
of factors that favor the Defendant or the Plaintiff.76 The Playtex Products decision shares a number of factor outcomes in common with both
Madison and Best Cellars where a finding of “consumer confusion” was
found (P). That factors F1 and F3 overlap with both Madison and Best
Cellars might give a lawyer scope to argue that the case has more in
common with those where likelihood of “consumer confusion” has been
found. Conversely, the fact that Playtex Products shares F8 and F4 with
only Best Cellars and both Madison and Best Cellars share decisions
of F2 and F5 in favor of the Plaintiff whereas Playtex Products does not,
gives a lawyer room to argue that the case is sufficiently different from
those in which the Plaintiff has won.
Case-based reasoning addresses the notion of legal decision making
as analogical, ordinal, and top-down. Outcomes in key cases heard
in higher courts, (in principle) bind determinations in lower courts.
For this reason, analogizing or distinguishing between the facts of a
current case and that of the leading cases replicates the way in which
cases are argued in court. This approach has led to the production of
a number of systems, including HYPO (on which the methodology
conveyed in Figure 2 is based), which compares sets of overlapping
dimensions between cases with respect to U.S. Trade Secret Law.77
It has also led to probabilistic variations on the aforementioned
case-based and rule-based approaches, as exemplified by the Shyster
program developed in Australia.78
Nevertheless, in practice, such systems are of questionable utility.
Similarities between cases are likely to be well known to domain
72. For the purposes of simplifying this example, the following explanation ignores the
order (year) in which the cases were decided, although it is recognized that this will inevitably have an impact upon comparability between cases/factors.
73. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Ga-Pac. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7838(HB), 2003 WL 21929706
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2003).
74. Madison Ave. Caviarteria, Inc. v. Caviaria.com, No. 04 Civ. 00493 RO, 2004 WL
744481 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004).
75. Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
76. Playtex Prods., 2003 WL 21929706, at *3–6.
77. Edwina L. Rissland & Kevin D. Ashley, A Case-Based System for Trade Secrets Law,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND LAW 60, 61–63 (1987); Stefanie Brüninghaus & Kevin D. Ashley, Generating Legal
Arguments and Predictions from case Texts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 65, 67–69 (2005).
78. See generally JAMES POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEM (1996).

2020]

THE DEVIL IN THE DETAIL

49

experts, and not easily understandable to lay users. 79 Whilst these
systems prompt compelling intellectual questions about the nature of
legal reasoning, their broader commercial value is unclear. Furthermore, case-based reasoning relies on the presumption of consistency
and the view that differences in case outcomes derive from the nuances
of reasoning. That decisions ought to be based on deductive or analogical reasoning is not to say that they are, even if outwardly this
appears to be the case.80 The easiest way to avoid being committed to
deductive rules alleged to prevail in an instance where “if P then Q”
would ordinarily apply, is to determine that the facts do not permit a
determination of P. This amounts to a Wittgensteinian re-writing of
the rules such that “no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule.”81 But if reasoning by deduction or analogy does not account for
the interpretive process, what does?
3. Discretion: Modeling Inputs & Outputs
The formalist view that judges interpret rather than make law
demands that any reasoning must stem from a plain reading of
relevant legislation, legal codes, and the case law rules of common law
and equity derived from previous judgements. Constraining inputs to
a specific range of sources operates to restrict a judge from projecting
his or her own opinions, values, or beliefs onto the process of decisionmaking. Thus, in theory, the positivist/formalist system of law is a
closed system in which new legal interpretations are grounded in and
arise from existing interpretations. However, if the existing legal
material is indeterminate because it can always be interpreted in
conflicting and contradictory ways, what drives the decision to adopt
one interpretation over another?
On this view, legal interpretation becomes less a form of bounded
reasoning (of the deductive/analogical variety) and more a process
of subjective political decision-making. This arguably casts doubt on
the idea that the law is a closed system, or that judges are as textual
as formalists suggest. That judges profess to be following rules or
precedent does not guarantee that this is the case. There may be other
types of reasoning that influence a decision, even if (by virtue of
79. Perhaps explaining why some systems were originally designed to assist law
students in learning the basics of legal reasoning, for example, Ashley and Aleven’s CATO
program. ASHLEY, supra note 60, at 3; Vincent Aleven & Kevin D. Ashley, Evaluating a
Learning Environment for Case-Based Argumentation Skills, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 170, 174 (1997).
80. See Beebe, supra note 63, at 1583–85 (discussing this in the context of trademark
law).
81. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1986). The relevance of this paradox in this context has also been noted by
Leith, Logic, Formal Models and Legal Reasoning, supra note 42, at 340.
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convention in which judges feel compelled to be seen to be following
the deductive or analogical “rules”) this reasoning does not appear
in the ratio decidendi. 82 Hence, from a realist perspective, judicial
interpretation amounts to the creation of law because it is only via
interpretation that legal meaning is formally settled. Judicial discretion, when coupled with the indeterminacy of law, provides scope for
reasoning to be influenced by a range of extra-systematic factors,
including (but not limited to): (i) the purpose of the law/intent of
legislators, (ii) fairness of outcome, 83 and (iii) the broader social/
policy/political/economic/legal impact of the decision. 84
On this view, the inevitable subjectivity of judicial interpretation
can only be revealed through the quantitative or qualitative study
of case outcomes in which a broad range of potential influences are
tested. This testing may involve qualitative techniques (e.g., textual
analysis that looks within decisions for evidence of motivations and
considerations that go beyond the prevailing logical or functional
criteria ordinarily applied), though it is more commonly associated
with quantitative techniques, notably the use of descriptive and inferential statistics, and more recently, analysis via ML. These methods
provide a way of testing the relationship between case inputs and case
outcomes, producing evidence to counter the view that the process of
interpretation is “scientific” in nature.
The application of these methods to legal decision-making in order
to test the validity of theoretical propositions reveals the influence
of a wide range of extraneous factors on judicial decision-making.
One such influence is mental fatigue, with research proposing that
successive decision-making taxes an individual’s executive function
and mental resources, increasing the tendency to simplify decisions
by accepting the status quo. 85 In the case of repeated judgments or
decisions this may explain the increased similarity of decisions 86
and the increased reliance on intuitive decision-making87 previously
observed. Other research has documented more obscure influences,
82. See generally Beebe, supra note 53; William E. Boyd, Law in Computers and
Computers in Law: Lawyer’s View of the State of the Art, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 267, 284–85 (1972).
83. MacCormick termed this “Everyday Logic” to mean “that which makes sense”
primarily because, in contrast to formal logic, everyday logic aligns with patterns of individual and social belief that give rise to expectations of normative behavior. See NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY ii (2003).
84. See supra note 82.
85. Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited
Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 247–48 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 6889, 6890 (2011) (discussing a relationship between the order of a
parole decision (before or after a food break) and the favorability of the decision to an applicant).
87. Anastasiya Pocheptsova et al., Deciding Without Resources: Resource Depletion and
Choice in Context, 46 J. MKT. RES. 344, 353 (2009).
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including correlations between the weather, current affairs, and case
outcomes in asylum seeker status adjudications. 88 Whilst certain
personal characteristics, including the political bias,89 ethnicity, age,
gender, and educational background of judges have been shown to
predict judicial decisions in other studies, perhaps explaining why
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are so contentious. 90
Modeling law using statistical methods, such as regression analysis,
involves reducing a particular outcome (for example: a legal decision,
the likelihood of litigation, a settlement amount, or the time taken to
progress through court) to a mathematical function. A hypothetical
example helps illustrate the point. Assume that we have in our possession a large number of case files on clinical (professional) negligence
claims. Insurers are required to record potential settlement or courtawarded amounts as liabilities on corporate accounting records, and
lawyers to whom this estimation task may be assigned are judged on
accuracy of their assessments. Experienced lawyers commonly review
case files and suggest an appropriate financial figure that they believe
the court would produce and then calculate from this the amount likely
to encourage a claimant to settle rather than to pursue litigation. They
draw on professional experience to inform these calculations but these
subjective (albeit informed) predictions are not always accurate, nor
does accuracy necessarily increase alongside experience.91
Although this process of reasoning is not well understood, it is not
unthinkable that case features/characteristics seen by lawyers as relevant in informing a settlement/judgement figure could be articulated
and encoded in a symbolic, rules-based system. Yet this would explain
only one lawyer’s perceptions of relevance, and would not account for
actual values recorded, values that may be the product of several
negotiations rather than the acceptance of a first offer. There is benefit
in standardizing the approach taken to predict settlement amounts,
by modeling the data in our case files to quantitatively explore the
relationship between various case features (variables) and outcome
amount. The same would also be true of variations on our hypothetical

88. Daniel L. Chen & Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of
Asylum Adjudications?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 237, 238 (2016).
89. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) (discussing the empirical evidence supporting politicized judicial decision-making).
90. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical
Study of Judicial Sterotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 68–69 (2017); David S. Abrams et. al., Do
Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 350 (2012); Thomas J. Miles
& Cass R. Sustein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHIC. L. REV. 761, 765
(2008).
91. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1346–47.
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if we were dealing with other forms of legal decision-making, such
as winning a case, evaluating parole risk, and/or calculating other
damages.
In our insurance hypothetical, descriptive statistics help us identify
(among other things) how many cases go to court, how many settle at
first offer, and/or the number of cases in which the initial settlement
amount is substantially different from the final settlement amount.
Inferential statistics involves deriving underlying probability distributions that may help assess differences between groups/test hypotheses
or make estimates. This allows us to extrapolate inferences beyond our
sample; to examine whether certain case or claimant features (e.g., age
of claimant, postcode, type of injury) are associated with higher/lower
settlement amounts, and to determine how confident (probabilistically
speaking) we should be in concluding that these patterns indicate a
real relationship rather than mere coincidence. Assuming our sample
is representative, the relationships revealed in our analysis can be
generalized beyond the cases we have examined. It is also possible to
link the inputs to the outputs, so as to determine the size of effect generated by different model parameters (variables/features). That is, to
examine the effect of claimant postcode or income on settlement
amount, as compared to the effect of injury type of settlement amount.
Doing so helps to reveal the features (variables) that are really driving
settlement outcomes.
The scientific model of inquiry on which the statistical model rests,
requires an analysis to be directed towards testing a particular hypothesis. In order to predict settlement amounts, we need an idea of
the variables/features of a case that we believe to be driving settlement
figures, and these go on to form the basis of our hypothesis. However,
if the interpretation of law is as inchoate a process as the preceding
analysis and the competing explanations of legal reasoning
suggest, we may not have a clear idea of the causes producing an
effect. This circumstance calls for ML approaches, as these require
no hypothesis testing or preconceived theory. 92 Rather than testing
select factors, ML models (which typically rely on vastly larger
datasets than that used for hypothesis-driven quantitative work, with
a far larger number of variables), effectively take the process of
inference one step back.93 Through the ingest of testing and training
data, and the mapping of inputs to outputs, only those features
(variables) shown to significantly contribute to an outcome (or to
the accuracy of predicting the right outcome when comparing
testing/training material) are included. These features inform the
92. See e.g., Lyria Bennett-Moses & Janet Chan, Using Big Data for Legal and Law
Enforcement Decisions Testing the New Tools, 37 UNSW L.J., 643, 648 (2014).
93. Id.

2020]

THE DEVIL IN THE DETAIL

53

development of a post-hoc explanatory theory,94 though the rational
construction of such a theory may prove difficult, for reasons discussed
further below.
ML methods (all of which have a statistical genesis and many of
which are employed in hypothesis testing approaches as well) are distinguished based on their learning style.95 Supervised or unsupervised
are the most prominent paradigms, though there are many methods
that fall outside this dichotomy (e.g., reinforcement learning) or which
take elements from both (e.g., semi-supervised methods).96 Supervised
learning methods are intended to produce predictions in respect of unseen data points (e.g., cases where the case features are known but the
outcome is not) by mapping existing data.97 They associate a set of inputs (factors) with another set of outputs (often termed labels), with
the implication being that some human effort is required to
establish and connect to the inputs. 98 Unsupervised learning is
more often focused on finding patterns within sets of data and attempting to attach a meaning to these patterns a posteriori, for example,
clustering claimants based on their age, profession, income and location, assuming they must share other similarities, and consequently
grouping them together for the purposes of litigation strategy.99
Both supervised and unsupervised approaches to ML, as well as
hybrid (semi-supervised) approaches, have been employed in the
academic setting. Chen and Eagel used supervised learning to create
a model to predict the outcome of U.S. asylum adjudications using a
set of input data.100 Wongchaisuwat’s U.S. Litigation Model identified
factors capable of predicting whether a patent is likely to be litigated
against and when this might happen, employing methods from both
the supervised learning domain (using an ensemble (voting) classification method) in conjunction with a clustering (unsupervised learning)

94. Id.
95. See generally KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC
PERSPECTIVE (2012).
96. See e.g., RICHARD SUTTON & ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN
INTRODUCTION (2018).
97. CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING (2006).
98. These labels can be real valued numbers (e.g., a dollar value when attempting to
predict a likely settlement amount) or categories (e.g., whether a claimant is likely to: accept
first settlement offer, accept later settlement offer, or refuse to settle). Murphy, supra note
95.
99. For an example of some methods for classification and analysis of multivariate
observations, see J. MacQueen, Some Methods for Classification and Analysis of Multivariate Observations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 281–297 (1967).
100. Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 238.
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method to improve performance.101 Whilst Bochereau employed a canonical supervised learning method to ascertain whether the Conseil
d'Etat would annul or confirm a bylaw on the basis of input variables
relating to regulations, bylaws, factual, and normative standards.102
Whilst the range of problems to which ML has been applied in law
has varied, common to all implementations irrespective of subject
matter is the need for quality data. Input data for ML can take many
different forms, drawing from the settlement example above, this
might include real valued numerical (scale), categorical, or nominal
data. Whilst complex linguistic or semantic constructs can be simplified for the purpose of analysis (e.g., recording the severity of claimant
injury as a point on a scale of 1 (minor) to 10 (severe)), there may be
some work required to get to data into this format. This is because
data must be “structured” in a way that allows for its inclusion in
statistical/machine learning models, necessitating organization in
the form of columns and rows (or equivalent). 103 This requirement
produces certain challenges in law where much of the data used is
“unstructured,” taking the form of natural language.
For this reason, recent advances in Natural Language Processing
(NLP) (the computational processing or “structuring” of language
drawing on rule-based, statistical, and ML techniques), which have
enabled text-based information to be incorporated into the ML/
statistical modeling process, are of clear significance for fields
such as law. NLP uses data-driven and rule-based techniques to
translate linguistic meaning into numerical meaning. 104 One such
101. Papis Wongchaisuwat et al., Predicting Litigation Likelihood and Time to Litigation
for Patents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 257, 257 (2017).
102. Laurent Bochereau et al., Extracting Legal Knowledge by Means of a Multilayer
Neural Network Application to Municipal Jurisprudence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 288, 290 (1991).
103. For example, SQL data commonly takes the form of relational tables, whereas nonSQL data, which is often scripted as JSON, does not present with the traditional column and
row format, though nonetheless, it is still capable of assuming that form.
104. See generally Julie Beth Lovins, Development of a Stemming Algorithm,
MECHANICAL TRANSLATION AND COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 22–31 (1968). Rule-based
methods have fallen out of fashion for achieving complex tasks (e.g., detecting sentiment
from text), but are still commonly used during pre-processing. For example, using a stemming algorithm, to ‘undo the rules’ that allow for all words in a body of text to be reduced to
their roots (e.g., ‘walking’ is mapped to ‘walk’, ‘willingness’ is mapped to ‘will’), so as to gain
topic insight. Mitchell Marcus et al., Building a large annotated corpus of English: The Penn
Treebank, UNIV. PA. SCHOLARLY COMMONS, Oct. 1993; William Schuler et al., Broad-Coverage Parsing Using Human-Like Memory Constraints, 36 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1,
313–330 (2010). Similarly, grammatical rules may be hand-crafted by a linguistic expert,
Eric Brill, A Simple Rule-Based Part of Speech Trigger, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
CONFERENCE ON APPLIED NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING, 152–55 (1992), with the goal of
performing ‘part-of-speech’ (POS) tagging where each word in a text is assigned a label denoting its grammatical role (noun, verb, adverb et cetera). See Table 2 in Laura Chiticariu
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implementation of NLP is feature extraction, which identifies and
extracts key content from written materials. For example, when using
summaries of a patient’s discharge reports to deduce a measure of
severity of injury, having a feature that reflects the presence of the
words “induced coma” might be a good indicator of whether the patient
suffered extensive trauma.105 More complex word embedding methods
use (unsupervised) ML to quantify the context of a word based on
the surrounding text, with semantically similar words assigned
mathematically “close” values-in vector space. 106 This consistency
allows for mathematical manipulation (Berlin - Germany + France
is approximately equal to Paris107 and King - Man + Woman is approximately equal to Queen 108 ) and can be expanded to incorporate
sentences.
These and more complex NLP techniques, such as deep learning,
have been used in a range of legal tasks associated with the process
et al., Rule-based Information Extraction is Dead! Long Live Rule-based Information Extraction Systems!, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 827, 829 (2013). However, specification of the rules may
be time-consuming and requires dependence on expert linguists. It can also give rise to the
potential for a high level of inter-annotator disagreement which operates to reduce scalability, whilst irregularities in language are difficult to address and not uncommon. Dat Quoc
& Son Bao Pham, Ripple Down Rules for Question Answering, SEMANTIC WEB (2015),
http://www.semantic-web-journal.net/content/ripple-down-rules-question-answering-0
[https://perma.cc/2SSD-8XHG]. Further, large numbers of rules may be used to capture such
irregularities, but interactions between rules may cause complications. CHRISTOPHER D.
MANNING, INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 293–320 (2008). In contrast, MLbased NLP does not require the same level of manual tuning; instead one hopes that the
training data is sufficient, and the model employed is apt to capture the relevant linguistic
rules. Nonetheless, rule-based feature engineering remains in use for some ML modelling
algorithms.
105. Note that while feature engineering often uses simple rules, (“is the phrase ‘induced
coma’ present in the text?”), the output of this rule is not the final output we are interested
in (the patient’s severity of injury), but forms an input to an ML model, which predicts
the final output. This example was modified from a hypertension example provided in Vijay
N. Garla & Cynthia Brandt, Ontology-Guided Feature Engineering for Clinical Text
Classification, 45 J. BIOMED. INFORMMATICS 992, 995–98 (2012).
106. See Miguel Kakanakou, Build and Visualize Word2Vec Model on Amazon Reviews,
BEEXPERT (Sept. 10, 2017), http://migsena.com/build-and-visualize-word2vec-modelon-amazon-reviews/; Christian S. Perone, Voynich Manuscript: Word Vectors and
t-SNE Visualization of Some Patterns, TERRA ICOGNITA (Jan. 16, 2016), http://blog.
christianperone.com/2016/01/voynich-manuscript-word-vectors-and-t-sne-visualization-ofsome-patterns/ [https://perma.cc/ABQ9-UWYY]; Kaspar Beelen, Visualizing Parliamentary
Discourse with Word2Vec and Gephi, ON HISTORY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://blog.history.ac.
uk/2015/08/visualizing-parliamentary-discourse-with-word2vec-and-gephi/ [https://perma.
cc/C3BB-HXFA].
107. Tomas Mikolov et al., Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and their
Compositionality, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 3111, 3115 (2013).
108. Ekaterina Vylomova et al., Take and Took, Gaggle and Goose, Book and Read:
Evaluating the Utility of Vector Differences for Lexical Relation Learning, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 54TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1671,
1671 (2016).
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of legal interpretation: to predict whether a new bill will become law,109
to accelerate legal review tasks,110 to identify deontic modalities in financial regulations,111 to facilitate an originalist interpretation of legal
language, 112 to improve the readability of legislative sentences, 113 to
create question and answer dialogues enabling naturalist interrogation of Supreme Court decisions,114 to automate text summarization,115
to derive legal knowledge 116 and argument schematics 117 from legal
texts, to quantify latent and manifest linguistic similarities between
legal documents,118 and to automate the review of national legislation
to identify implementation of European Union (EU) directives.119
Using the aforementioned NLP techniques to structure data and
ML techniques to expose correlations between different variables and
outcomes, it is possible to test the objectivity of judicial decision109. John J. Nay, Predicting and Understanding Law-Making with Word Vectors and an
Ensemble Model, 12 PLO ONE, May 10, 2017, at 12.
110. Ngoc Phuoc An Vo et al., Experimenting Word Embeddings in Assisting Legal
Review, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 189, 192 (2017).
111. Paul Buitelaar et al., Classifying Sentential Modality in Legal Language: a use Case
in Financial Regulations, Acts and Directives, 10 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 159, 159 (2017).
112. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1312–13 (2017); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can
Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original
Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1212–23 (2017); Nathan Kozuskanich,
Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment: What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to
the Founders?, 10 J. CONST. L. 413, 415–16 (2008).
113. See, e.g., Michael Curtotti et al., Machine Learning for Readability of Legislative
Sentences, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 53, 53 (2015); L. Karl Branting et al., Automated Drafting of SelfExplaining Documents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 72, 72 (1997).
114. Jose Gabriel Lopes et al., Question/Answer Dialogues for Interfacing a Database
with Supreme Court Decisions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 255, 255 (1997).
115. Claire Grover et al., Automatic Summarisation of Legal Documents, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW 243, 243 (2003); Ben Hachey & Claire Grover, Automatic Legal Text Summarisation:
Experiments with Summary Structuring, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 75, 77 (2005).
116. Vassilis Konstantinou et al., Can Legal Knowledge be Derived from Legal Texts?, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW 218, 224 (1993).
121. Katarzyna Budzynska & Serena Villata, Argument Mining, 17 IEEE INTELL.
INFORMATICS BULL. 1, 1–2 (2016).
118. Erich Schweighofer et al., Information Filtering: The Computation of Similarities
in Large Corpora of Legal Texts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119, 119 (1995).
119. Rohan Nanda et al., A Unifying Similarity Measure for Automated Identification of
National Implementations of European Union Directives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 149, 150 (2017).
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making, and to expose subjective, circumstantial, or ostensibly
irrelevant factors influencing legal outcomes. However, whilst this
type of quantitative analysis is intended to inform legal reasoning,
it is not always credited with this accomplishment. Quantitative empirical methods of understanding decision-making or interpretation
(linguistic or otherwise) have attracted criticism for failing to illuminate certain aspects of legal reasoning. 120 To those who approach
legal reasoning from a different theoretical position, such findings
may be discounted as entirely obvious, and the value they add in
systematically validating what to some is “obvious,” is often overlooked.
Conversely, findings may be viewed as counter-intuitive and nonsensical—not just because they contradict widely held views as to the
objective and logical nature of legal reasoning.
Variables are included in a hypothesis-led model because existing
theories drawn from law or related fields suggest a relationship
between that input and output. As such, where a relationship is shown
to exist, the reasoning underpinning the theory serves as the starting
point by which to explain the actuality. However, the bigger the available data, the greater risk of severing the theory-data connection,121
particularly when employing ML techniques in which variable
selection is not theory-led. This may see certain variables enhance
predictive accuracy even though such variables do not enhance our
understanding of judicial decision-making.122
Issues translating quantitative findings in a legally meaningful
way are magnified where the relationship between inputs and outputs
is not just difficult to explain but also difficult to disentangle, as is
often the case when using Big Data or NLP and drawing on thousands
of variables/features. Claims that the hugely complex black box models
produced in ML are of limited utility in respect of understanding
phenomena are not unique to legal decision-making: the Defense
Advanced Research Policy Agency (DARPA) has created a research
120. See Ashley & Rissland, supra note 60, at 240; Ashley, supra note 64, at 100 (discussing the Hypo system, Ashley reports that “legal factor weights are sensitive to the particular context . . . judges and attorneys do not argue about the weight of legal factors in
quantitative terms . . . legal domain experts do not agree what the weights are, and combining positive and negative weights numerically obscures the need for arguing about the resolution of competing legal factors”).
121. OSONDE OSOBA & WILLIAM WELSER IV, AN INTELLIGENCE IN OUR IMAGE: THE RISKS
OF BIAS AND ERRORS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 17–18 (2017); OSONDE A. OSOBA & PAUL
K. DAVIS, An Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Perspective on Social Simulation New
Data and New Challenges 11 (DARPA, Working Paper No. 1213, 2018).
122. Chen and Eagel’s paper operates as a case in point, with their predictive model able
to correctly classify 82% of cases on the basis of a mix of variables, including case factors,
judge factors, the weather, and the news cycle. See Chen & Eagel, supra note 71, at 238.
Whilst incorporating weather in the model enhances its predictive accuracy, weather is not
an obvious influence on judicial behavior and serves only to confuse rather than enhance an
understanding of judicial decision-making. Id.
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group called Explainable Artificial Intelligence123 with interpretability
as its key focus.124 For this reason, models, which clearly articulate
how important each input is in decision-making, are favored over those
where the model internals are so complicated that this information is
not retrievable. 125 However, there are circumstances in which the
features relied on by an ML algorithm will be of secondary interest.
If, for example, the sole function of an ML algorithm is to classify
cases into group A or B, then assuming the ML algorithm replicates
human classification with sufficient precision (by drawing on a set
of human-annotated A and B cases), addressing the theory-data
gap may be unnecessary.126 Nevertheless, acknowledging and understanding these issues at the outset is critical and this importance is
magnified as natural language processing is used to yield increasingly
complex models.
As the preceding section makes clear, it is possible (albeit with some
caveats) to represent hypothetical and actual judicial interpretation
and decision-making as a function of cascading rules, overlapping
precedent, and/or the influence of subjective bias represented by
statistical patterns in data. The examples discussed above highlight
the methods for doing so. Yet whilst most scholarship in the field of
AI and law has focused on “black letter law”—that is, “the basic
principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or embodied
in the statutes of a particular jurisdiction,”127 this is only one part of
the AI and law picture. The embodiment of law in AI systems extends
beyond judicial interpretation, encompassing both the bargains struck
between private parties and the public and private enforcement
governing those bargains, as the following section reveals.
B. Private Bargaining & Transacting
Within the framework of the law, individuals have autonomy to
engage in private ordering of disputes, creating, interpreting, and
enforcing their own permutations of “law,” and rights/responsibilities
through bargaining and agreement. Private bargaining and
123. See generally David Gunning, Explainable Artificial Intelligence Program Update
November 2017, DARPA/120 (2017), https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/XAIProgram
Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MSN-LXSR].
124. Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEFENSE ADVANCED
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificialintelligence [https://perma.cc/X7QC-HJ5A].
125. Gunning, supra note 123.
126. Osobra and Davis, supra note 117, at iii (The theory-data gap refers to the “mismatch between measurable data streams and meaningful explanatory theories to frame the
data.”).
127. John Zeleznikow et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law–Using Utility
Functions to Support Legal Negotiation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 237, 237 (2007).
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transacting have given rise to two key inter-related manifestations of
AI: (1) tools designed to reduce the transaction costs of bargaining, and
(2) tools to simulate the process of bargaining itself.
1. Reducing Bargaining Transaction Costs
The private ordering (or application of law) between parties is
motivated by a common goal—pursuing agreement as to a transaction
or exchange. This agreement is reached (or not) by bargaining,
incentivized by utility 128 gain for both parties, and formalized via
some official or unofficial means (e.g., written contract, handshake,
verbal agreement, performance). As with legislation and case law,
the rights and responsibilities that derive from a private agreement
are also subject to interpretation; occasionally by a judge in the context
of a dispute, but more often by the parties themselves in the process
of bargaining, and for the purpose of informing estimates regarding
the utility of an agreement. This interpretation may be influenced
by cultural, social, or community expectations in a way that reveals a
normative basis to law.129 It may also be influenced by presumptions
about other legal sources, what they are seen to protect/enforce, and
what they might conceivably demand of a party in the event of
non-performance. These perceptions are learned in a social context130
which gives rise to the potential for misperception and misalignment
between parties. Indeed, the possibility of conflict between parties
as to interpretation is not so remote given that “the vast majority of

128. Utility is used here in an economic sense to describe the usefulness of the transaction/outcome of the transaction.
129. See Pascoe Pleasence et al., Wrong About Rights: Public Knowledge of Key Areas of
Consumer, Housing and Employment Law in England and Wales, 80 MOD. L. REV. 836, 839
(2017) (for a broad discussion of influences); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 115 (1991) (exploring how social norms may displace formal sources of law); Janice F. Dyer & Conner Bailey, A Place to Call Home: Cultural
Understandings of Heir Property among Rural African Americans, 73 RURAL SOC. 317, 317–
18 (2008) (for an example of community and cultural norms displacing formal legal expectations in regards to “heir property” amongst African American communities).
130. Winnifred R. Louis & Donald M. Taylor, Rights and Duties as Group Norms:
Implications of Intergroup Research for the Study of Rights and Responsibilities, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND NORMATIVE
COMMENTARIES 105, 107 (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005).
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the population systematically mispredicts . . . the content of the law”131
for reasons that have been attributed to issue of salience,132 rationalism (the “need to know”),133 or ignorance.134
Any gap between perceptions of the rights and responsibilities an
agreement between parties is presumed to generate, and the rights
and responsibilities it does generate (or would likely generate were the
agreement to be analyzed judicially) is exacerbated by the fact that the
law does not only exist to give effect to private agreements between
parties, but also to set broader standards of behavior with which
private agreements should conform. In the context of private legal
transactions (whether that transaction amounts to an exchange of
value, the cessation of a legal relationship through divorce, or the
resolution of a dispute) where the parties have the ability to buy
knowledge in the form of legal services, it becomes easier to close the
gap. However, although this positions a party to better evaluate the
risks and benefits associated with agreeing to be bound by certain
rights/responsibilities, and to offset or accommodate these realities in
the bargain, it also increases transaction costs and inversely diminishes utility. The failure to exhaustively investigate the potential
implications of a bargain operates to increase transaction risk but
reduce transaction cost, whilst conversely thoroughness reduces risk
but increases cost.
Improvements in the storage and processing capacity of computers
have enabled the accumulation of vast amounts of data drawn from
business, social networks, transaction records, and communications.
This information is valuable insofar as it is capable of being translated
into strategic insight that informs an assessment of the utility of a
bargain at an economic rate. Of course, as the scale of data has
expanded, so has the cost of its review. In the context of private
ordering this is where AI has principally been used—to improve
knowledge of transaction risk (including the transaction risk
associated with pursuing litigation) without increasing transaction
costs. The application of AI in this context has, as a result, focused
131. Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 734
(2009).
132. See, e.g., LaVell E. Saunders, Collective Ignorance: Public Knowledge of Family Law,
24 FAMILY COORDINATOR, Jan. 1975, at 69; Jo Casebourne et al., EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AT
WORK: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYEES 2005 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2006); Pascoe
Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Ignorance in Bliss: Modeling Knowledge of Rights in Marriage
and Cohabitation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 2, 297 (2012).
133. Casebourne, supra note 136, at 19.
134. See, e.g., Peter Bowal, A Study Of Lay Knowledge Of Law In Canada, IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 121 (1999); PASCOE PLEASENCE & NIGEL J. BALMER, HOW PEOPLE RESOLVE
‘LEGAL’ PROBLEMS (2014); Catrina Denvir et al., When legal rights are not a reality: do individuals know their rights and how can we tell?, 35 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 139 (2013);
Pleasence et al., supra note 129, at 837 n.6.
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less on modeling legal reasoning, and more on gathering inputs that
might inform the legal (and often the economic) reasoning that takes
place during bargaining and negotiation—as the use of e-discovery
tools makes clear.
In the litigation setting, litigation proceeds only after a detailed
discovery process has taken place in which relevant material is shared
between parties.135 This process first involves in-depth document review in which materials are identified as responsive or unresponsive
to a disclosure request, and materials identified as responsive are
redacted to uphold legal privilege.136 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scope
of potentially relevant documents has only increased as a result of the
digitization of data, creating an audit trail of correspondence, internet
search history, phone records, text messages, electronic transfers, file
downloads, and so forth. The amount of data now subject to disclosure
vastly increases the time required for manual review and therefore
the associated transaction costs. So much so that in some instances it
may be preferable to settle a case rather than assume the costs of
undertaking disclosure (let alone the cost of other elements of case
management and representation).137 In an effort to offset these costs,
AI (largely employing ML techniques, including NLP) has been used
to develop computer assisted human review (CAHR) and human-aided
computer review (HACR) techniques. 138 This has bred a number of
commercial e-discovery software packages, examples of which include
kCura Relativity, Ringtail, Logikcull, and Thomson Reuters eDiscovery Point. 139 The growth in the number of commercial e-discovery
products made available over the last decade has not been founded
on advances in AI, but rather on packaging freely available NLP
code within intuitive interfaces. Hence, although these systems may
be optimized to perform legal review tasks and reliant on specifically

135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
137. See Ross Chaffin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115 (2006), for a relevant
example.
138. See Christopher Hogan et al., Human-Aided Computer Cognition for E-Discovery,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND LAW 194, 194 (2009), for a deciprtion of the distinction between the two.
139. See About Us, RELATIVITY, https://www.relativity.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
H8Z6-X7AX]; Early Case Assessment, Investigations and Document Review, RINGTAIL,
https://www.ringtail.com/ringtail-ediscovery-software/early-case-assessment [https://perma.
cc/AKB5-T3PU]; About Logikcull, LOGIKCULL, https://logikcull.com/company/#about [https://
perma.cc/JZB6-SAA6]; eDiscovery Point, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legalsolutions.
thomsonreuters.com/law-products/solutions/ediscovery-point [https://perma.cc/9BLF-ZJLR].
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developed taxonomies and ontologies (though the level of this
optimization has been subject to debate140), they are not forms of AI
unique to law.
Such tools address a particular gap in the market created by the
redundancy of previous approaches. For example, the increasing scale
of data has rendered filtering documents by keyword searching (the
first implementation of document review) insufficient, and modern
filtering techniques have started to take into account the context of
words.141 Other implementations (e.g., in the context of email correspondence) have moved to incorporate knowledge about dependencies
between topics.142 But as is the case with models designed to embody
legal reasoning processes, with greater model complexity comes
reduced transparency. This is an issue of no small consequence given
that discovery is governed by a range of legal obligations and consequences.143 Efforts to discharge those obligations using electronic tools
require legal approval and this can lag behind development. Predictive
coding for disclosure (i.e. using ML NLP based techniques to frame a
disclosure search request, rather than traditional keyword or Boolean
logic searching) has been available for over two decades.144 Yet in the
United States, although e-discovery and technology assisted review
have been permitted by way of the 2015 changes to the Federal Civil
Procedure Act, and judicially approved in Moore v. Publicis Groupe,145
challenge is possible in instances where it can be shown that the
process does not produce reliable and/or proportional results.146
Similarly, due diligence, contract review, and lease review
processes have also benefitted from ML implementations. This is
because in the absence of some form of automation, documents are
reviewed in a linear, manual fashion, making it difficult to acquire
140. Eugene Yang et al., Effectiveness Results for Popular e-Discovery Algorithms, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW 261, 261 (2017).
141. Phuoc An Vo et al., supra note 110, at 192.
142. See Jyothi K. Vinjumur, Evaluating Expertise and Sample Bias Effects for Privilege
Classification in E-Discovery, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119, 120 (2015).
143. See, e.g., West African Gas Pipeline Company Ltd v. Willbros Global Holdings Inc
[2012] EWHC 396 (TCC), 141 ConLR 151 (England & Wales); Dan H. Willoughby et al.,
Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 791 (2010).
144. See Michael Aikenhead, Legal Knowledge Based Systems: Some Observations on the
Future, WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1995), https://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/
WebJCLI/1995/issue2/aiken2.html [https://perma.cc/QDM2-H7UV].
145. Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012).
146. In England and Wales these methods were not judicially approved as discharging
the obligation to perform a “reasonable search” under rule 31.7 of Practice Direction 31B on
the disclosure of electronic documents until the 2016 case of Pyrrho Investments. See Pyrrho
Investments Ltd v. MWB Property Ltd & Ors, [2016] EWHC 256 (Ch) (England & Wales),
31B PD (DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS).
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global appreciation of overall risks. However “entity recognition”
software packages designed to extract key details from a vast range of
material (structured and unstructured) can vastly accelerate the process of document review.147 For example, in the context of a business
merger requiring the review of vast numbers of mortgage/loan/lease
agreements for which a purchaser will assume responsibility, the
extraction of key details (such as value, duration, expiry dates, parties,
addresses, asset return/yield/encumbrance) enables the quantification
of risk and an appreciation of the economic and legal liabilities being
assumed by a purchaser, as well as the potential investment yield.
These forms of complex analytics bring a range of advantages in
assessing the risk/benefits of a transaction, including the accuracy of
asset pricing and the discovery of potential legal problems (e.g.,
through the identification of unusual contract clauses). Whilst these
implementations have tended to accompany traditional forms of
bargaining (face to face, verbal, written), there have also been efforts
to automate elements of the bargaining process, including that of
offer and acceptance.
2. Simulating Bargaining
Attempts to model the way in which bargains are struck in private
(between individual rather than corporate actors), have drawn on theories from the social, behavioral, and economic sciences. More recently,
game theory has been used to inform formal and normative models of
bargaining148 and to augment/underpin the dynamics of hybrid rulebased/case-based reasoning software created to simulate bargaining
in family law disputes.149 Though the intent is to simulate “real life”
bargaining, the extent to which game theory accurately represents
how bargaining agents operate in the real world and the factors
that inform their evaluation of the risk/benefit/utility of a bargain,
remains subject to doubt. Models based on game theory often assume
that agents are perfectly rational and operate to maximize their
147. See iManage RAVN, IMANAGE, https://imanage.com/product/ravn/ [https://perma.
cc/27W2-KBAG]; About Kira Systems, KIRA, https://www.kirasystems.com/about/ [https://
perma.cc/SKH5-BJWD]; Homepage, BRAINSPACE, https://www.brainspace.com/ [https://
perma.cc/N7LQ-BJV3]; About Drooms, DROOMS, https://drooms.com/en/about [https://
perma.cc/HP5H-QW5P].
148. See, e.g., Elisa Burato & Matteo Cristani, Contract Clause Negotiation by Game
Theory, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 71 (2007) (discussing the use of game theory to simulate the process
of contract clause negotiation).
149. See, e.g., John Zeleznikow & Emilia Bellucci, Family-Winner: Integrating Game
Theory and Heuristics to Provide Negotiation Support, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS 21, 22 (2003); Emilia
Bellucci & John Zeleznikow, Family-Negotiator: An Intelligent Tool for Supporting Legal
Negotiation in Australian Family Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 359 (1997).
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utility in all circumstances, despite research observing that humans
“often do not actually have the stable utility functions postulated by
both rational-actor theory and usual versions of bounded-rationality
theory.”150
Bargaining is also contingent upon the transmission of beliefs, since
each agent must believe that a certain decision is capable of benefiting
them both in order for a bargain to be struck/negotiation to be successful. Belief transmission is not static but dynamic, evolving in light of
the passing of time, the receipt of new information, the network in
which exposure to the belief occurs, and the resistance to belief change
exhibited by an agent when faced with contradictory information. 151 It
is possible to accommodate some of these dynamic features to, for
example, incorporate a measure of authority to represent the weighted
plurality of beliefs in an agent’s local networks as others have done.152
Yet, the complexity of human decision-making in respect of law,
bargaining, and other difficult problems may not be capable of expression via AI. Arguably, the interaction between agent-based models,
social identity theory, and nudge economics that combine to produce
a bargain in a given situation are unlikely to accommodate distillation
into chains of rules (in the case of symbolic approaches) or
intelligible mappings between inputs and outputs (in the case of
sub-symbolic/probabilistic methodologies). And, in respect of the latter,
there are risks associated with bargaining to a “curve.”153
Certain software such as “Picture it Settled,” which employs negotiation move planning and probabilistic evaluation of case outcome,
has enjoyed some commercial success.154 Other tools, such as eBay’s
dispute resolution platform, which uses a rules-based decision tree to
diagnose problems and propose options for resolution, have come to
replace human mediated forms of online dispute resolution (ODR).155
Nevertheless, simulated models of bargaining remain a niche area,
though one that continues to capture the imagination of a range of
stakeholders who see it as capable of promoting access to justice and
accelerating the bargaining and dispute resolution process between

150. See, e.g., Osoba & Davis, An Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Perspective
on Social Simulation: New Data and New Challenges, supra note 121, at 10.
151. See id. at 17–18 (showing that if the initial beliefs of all agents are specified and the
simulation is then executed, the fraction of the agents believing “something” changes over
time).
152. See id.
153. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 31, at 1339.
154. See About, PICTURE IT SETTLED, http://www.pictureitsettled.com/about-2/ [https://
perma.cc/QU6J-9APD].
155. Ayelet Sela, Can Computers Be Fair? How Automated and Human-Powered Online
Dispute Resolution Affect Procedural Justice in Mediation and Arbitration, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISPUT. RESOL. 91, 93 (2018).
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lay parties.156 Indeed, it remains an active area of research for the likes
of Facebook,157 notwithstanding the fact that implementing such tools
in practice relies upon greater structural changes to the legal system.
In alternative dispute resolution systems the law is framed around
dispute disposal via settlement, 158 necessitating cooperation of both
parties, awareness of what is a fair outcome, and awareness of the
consequences attached to non-compliance. 159 In the absence of
these conditions being met, the “law” that emerges in the process of
bargaining becomes merely a reflection of the power-relations/equality
of arms between parties. Systems may incentivize cooperation and/or
introduce protections to constrain the actions of those who exhibit poor
bargaining abilities, though not without a loss of autonomy. Even with
such protections, agreements reached can be reneged upon, with the
formal legal system offering the only avenue of recourse. And, whilst
this is not an issue unique to bargaining that occurs online, there is
reason to believe that technology exacerbates a sense of detachment
from responsibility,160 perhaps more so where autonomy is viewed as
being impeded.161
Although the law has adopted a technological equivalence approach—a belief that laws and rules should be equivalent in online and
offline spaces—this does not always correspond with user perceptions.
The disinhibiting effect of online communication leads to an online/offline cognitive divide in which the consequences of actions in the online
world are not always seen as translating to the offline world. 162 For
this reason enforcement remains a key issue in respect to bargaining
156. Among those interested parties are the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales,
who have proposed that an online dispute resolution system for low value civil claims incorporating an “automated negotiation” process would enable better administration of justice,
though have remained silent with regards to the more critical details regarding feasibility
and function. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP,
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LOW VALUE CIVIL CLAIMS 3–5 (2015).
157. Mike Lewis et al., Deal or No Deal? Training AI Bots to Negotiate, FACEBOOK
ENGINEERING (June 14, 2017), https://code.fb.com/ml-applications/deal-or-no-deal-trainingai-bots-to-negotiate/ [https://perma.cc/V35N-N8CY]; see also Mike Lewis et al., Deal or No
Deal? End-to-End Learning for Negotiation Dialogues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017
CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2443 (2017).
158. Extrapolating Genn’s argument that in the context of alternative dispute resolution, the result is access to a “settlement” and not to “justice.” As, “[t]he mediator does not
make a judgement about the quality of the settlement.” Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice
For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 411 (2012).
159. See generally id.
160. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet:
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services,
INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 1, 1–11 (2016) (discussing the tendency of social media users to accept
a platform’s privacy policy “without accessing, viewing, or reading any part of it”).
161. Mary L. Cummings, Automation and Accountability in Decision Support System
Interface Design, 32 J. TECH. STUD. 23, 23 (2006).
162. Brian Christopher Jones, The Online/Offline Cognitive Divide: Implications for
Law, 13 SCRIPTED 83, 87–91 (2016); Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 160, at 15.
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and failure to accommodate dimensions of enforcement in the online
space ultimately diminishes the potential contribution automated
negotiation systems might make to access to justice. The seeming lack
of consideration as to how enforcement might feature as part of an
automated AI-enhanced bargaining system is interesting given that
separately, an entire field of enforcement and compliance software
has developed as part of the “regtech” (regulatory technology) movement.163
C. Public Enforcement & Private Compliance
Technology has been applied in a number of ways in public enforcement and private compliance to support the coercive function of law.
Public enforcement refers to the work undertaken by public agencies
to monitor adherence to rules or access to entitlements. This activity
is not limited to criminal justice agencies, but also incorporates the
work of government departments authorized to allocate resources and
tasked with monitoring this allocation. As with other domains, software development in the regulatory field have involved both symbolic
and non-symbolic approaches to AI, yielding tools to: identify welfare
fraud,164 determine supplementary benefit entitlement,165 identify tax
law abuse,166 and address conflict of laws in legislative drafting.167 In
criminal justice, the U.S. has led the application of statistical techniques to data containing information about reoffending rates and
socio-demographic characteristics to inform parole decisions, 168 with
other jurisdictions following suit.169 ML has also been used to model
167. See, e.g., THE REGTECH BOOK: THE FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK FOR
INVESTORS, ENTREPRENEURS AND VISIONARIES IN REGULATION (Janos Barberis et al. eds.,
2019).
168. Amie Meers et al., Lessons Learnt About Digital Transformation and Public
Administration: Centrelink’s Online Compliance Intervention, COMMONWEALTH
OMBUDSMAN, July 2017, at 4; ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COUNCIL, AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE
IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING: REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL 15 (2004).
165. See T.J.M. Bench-Capon et al., Logic Programming for Large Scale Applications in
Law: A Formalisation of Supplementary Benefit Legislation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 190, 191–92 (1987)
(discussions relating to DHSS Demonstrator Project at Imperial University).
166. Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-Evolution of Tax
Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW 79, 79 (2015).
167. Tingting Li et al., A Model-Based Approach to the Automatic Revision of Secondary
Legislation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 202, 204 (2013).
168. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION : PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 7–38 (2007).
169. For example, England and Wales have recently reported using historical police records to inform custody risk decisions. See Chris Baraniuk, Durham Police AI to Help with
Custody Decisions, BBC NEWS ONLINE (May 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-39857645 [https://perma.cc/4DPD-KV2Z].
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the “future dangerousness” of parolees and inform sentencing decisions,170 whilst neural networks have been used to extract “entities”
(“facts”) from police reports to aid in the criminal investigation process.171 Further variations in the form of “smart city infrastructure”
have been designed to: alert enforcement agencies to gunshots fired in
real time by using ML to analyze acoustic sensor data,172 use AI security cameras for the identification of unattended bags in busy areas,173
and detect crime clusters for the purposes of resource management.174
In the realm of private enforcement, self-governance—in which
regulators have taken the veracity of data contained within corporate
information returns on trust—has become increasingly uncommon
following the 2008 global financial crisis.175 This has seen regulators
permit less autonomy and demand more granular information from
regulated entities.176 These increased regulatory duties have acted as
a catalyst for the development of AI tools intended to minimize the cost
of regulatory compliance for certain industries. This is of particular
relevance in finance, where large exposures, liquidity measures, collateral, capital levels, and stress tests must be reported to regulatory
agencies, and where discharging obligations in respect of prudential
regulations, data reporting, execution of trades, money laundering, financing of terrorism, due diligence (Know your Customer—KYC), and

170. See generally RICHARD A. BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE
LEARNING APPROACH (2012).
171. See, e.g., Michael Chau et al., Extracting Meaningful Entities from Police Narrative
Reports, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2002 ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 1 (2002).
172. See ShotSpotter Technology, SHOTSPOTTER, http://www.shotspotter.com/technology
[https://perma.cc/AX2L-WKMA].
173. See, e.g., Intel AI Developer Program: Unattended Baggage Detection Using Deep
Neural networks in Intel Architecture, INTEL DEVELOPER ZONE (last updated Apr. 16, 2018),
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/unattended-baggage-detection-using-deep-neuralnetworks-in-intel-architecture [https://perma.cc/PEN6-ECUW]; Movidius, INTEL MOVIDIUS,
https://www.movidius.com/ [https://perma.cc/H3JY-BYH3].
174. See Homepage, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/ [https://perma.cc/DVX2LH2L].
175. This is illustrated with reference to the Supranational Basel II Capital adequacy
framework (which specifies the amount of cash reserves that must be retained by a financial
institution in order to cover market, credit, and operating risks), in respect of which large
financial institutions were permitted to use their own risk management models in determining the level of capital to be held. However, this created an incentive to underestimate credit
risk so as to minimize the size of compulsory ring-fenced capital. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner
et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J.
INT’L LAW & BUS. 371, 388 (2017); Harald Benink & George Kaufman, Turmoil Reveals the
Inadequacy of Basel II, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/0e8404a2e54e-11dc-9334-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/V22D-E8JR].
176. Harriet Agnew, Andy Haldane Seeks Real-Time Global View, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/4a2fbe2e-6053-11e4-88d1-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.
cc/2ATG-2BSK].
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data protection can be onerous.177 AI has also been used to enhance
business intelligence, with complex models employed to build
consumer credit risk algorithms that draw on information about
the debtor, and on the historical transaction (default) patterns of consumers.178 Variations that have made it to the market include tools
that employ a combination of rule-based, ML, and NLP approaches
to provide onboarding/customer screening, transaction and trade
monitoring, alert management and investigation solutions, and regulatory update dashboards.179
Increased regulation and reporting requirements are one way of
managing risk, though the pressure placed on organizations and institutions to discharge these responsibilities as efficiently as possible, can
lead to the principles and values enshrined in other laws being sacrificed in the service of compliance. The use of AI to discharge regulatory
duties may offer public benefit where the costs of compliance are not
ultimately passed onto consumers, as may ordinarily be the case. However, technology in the regulatory space may operate to prioritize risk
mitigation in favor of other goals and values enshrined by law. For
example, the use of ML in retail banking to predict the probability of
a customer defaulting on a loan can have perverse consequences. In a
regulatory environment that dissuades excessive risk-taking, refusing
loans and prioritizing assets with a better risk/yield profile may operate to exclude a wide range of customers who report socio-demographic
characteristics that have been historically associated with higher rates
of default.180
Compliance with regulation, particularly where that compliance
involves automation, may create perverse incentives to operate in a
way that brings into play other risks.181 Evidently, this is not a consequence of AI, but may be exacerbated by AI depending on the goals to
which algorithms are orientated—exemplifying the broader AI Value

177. See Financial Stability Board, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in
Financial Services Market Developments and Financial Stability Implications, FIN.
STABILITY BOARD 1, 1–40 (2017) (providing an overview of developments).
178. Bart van Liebergen, Machine Learning: A Revolution in Risk Management and
Compliance?, CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 60, 61 (2017).
179. See, e.g., About Us, MERLON INTELLIGENCE, https://merlonintelligence.com/about/
(last visited Aug. 1, 2018); About, FISCALNOTE, https://fiscalnote.com/about/ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018); Regulatory Change Management for the Modern Financial, COMPLIANCE.AI,
https://www.compliance.ai/who-we-serve [https://perma.cc/98SV-XPDB].
180. See, e.g., Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation”, AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50, 53.
181. For example, Friedman and Kraus argue that Basel rules created perverse incentives to invest in the mortgage-backed securities that caused the global financial crisis. See
JEFFREY FRIEDMAN & WLADIMIR KRAUS, ENGINEERING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC
RISK AND THE FAILURE OF REGULATION 2 (2011).
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Alignment discussion. 182 It is not clear how regulatory technology
might be programed or how it might respond to ethical dilemmas that
occur in particular business contexts. Choices inevitably have to be
made but doing so can lead to a form of inequality that is magnified
and ultimately structurally embedded as a result of its application at
arm’s length from human decision-makers.183
This only serves to reinforce the fact that in the enforcement of law,
as with its interpretation and application, the benefits brought by AI
are not evenly distributed. AI tools further the interests, agendas, assumptions, and expectations of their creators. Whilst not all interests
are to be construed cynically, it is nonetheless important to try to make
sense of the risks posed by various AI systems and approaches; to look
beyond specific examples so as to consider the framework that emerges
at the intersection of AI and law and in whose interests it serves.
D. Representing Law using AI
AI systems necessarily impose a particular interpretation of what
the law is and how its constituent features (interpretation, application,
and enforcement) should function. As our review of these systems
makes clear, technical complexity can operate to obscure a clear view
of the implications associated with implementation. Often these complexities are exacerbated in the market where vendors have a vested
interest in generating a sense of awe as to the seemingly sentient/
superhuman nature of certain products. However, our understanding
of legal AI can be vastly simplified if instead of focusing on the detailed
technical intricacies of the technology itself, we focus on the model of
law that a given AI approach necessarily imposes. If we are cognizant
of the model of law being imposed, then we are better positioned to
assess whether that model is appropriate in a given situation.
As our review of the development of law machines reveals, law has
been variously represented in AI systems as a product of formalist
interpretation of source material (rule-based systems), judicial custom
(case-based reasoning), sociological bias (data-driven systems), normatively framed bargaining outcomes (argumentation systems), linguistic interpretation (NLP systems), and regulatory self-governance (RegTech). But, although legal AI has done well to represent the various
182. See, e.g., The Value Alignment Problem, LEVERHULME CTR. FOR FUTURE
INTELLIGENCE,
http://lcfi.ac.uk/projects/ai-futures-and-responsibility/value-alignmentproblem/ [https://perma.cc/JR56-4WY5].
183. See, e.g., Marion Oswald, Algorithm-Assisted Decision-making in the Public Sector:
Framing the Issues Using Administrative Law Rules Governing Discretionary Power, 376
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. 1, 8 (2018); MEERS ET AL., supra note 132, at 2;
ALGORITHEMWATCH, AUTOMATING SOCIETY TAKING STOCK OF AUTOMATED DECISIONMAKING IN THE EU 8 (Matthias Spielkamp ed., 2019); Thomas J. Barth & Eddy Arnold,
Artificial Intelligence and Administrative Discretion Implications for Public Administration,
29 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 332, 346–47 (1999).
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manifestations of law and the theoretical models thought to underpin
these manifestations, it does less well to integrate these models in a
way that recognizes their pluralistic interplay. Though not always
the case,184 each incarnation of legal AI tends to reflect only one interpretation of how we understand “law,” and in doing so implies that it
is possible for law (as a system) to be represented via a single explanatory model that is mutually exclusive from and superior to other
models of understanding.
We oppose this view: as a complex system, the crux of “law” lies not
in one model of interpretation, but in the interaction between all
of these models of interpretation. Legal systems exist not just to give
effect to rights and responsibilities, but also to provide an infrastructure within which those rights and responsibilities can be contested,
developed, adapted, and evolved to better balance interests, reflect
social needs, enact justice, and accommodate rule of law constraints.
As such, it is not possible to account for the many and varied constructions of law using one computational (or for that matter epistemological) paradigm. Any application of AI that adopts one computational
representation of law to the exclusion of all others, must consider
the impact of doing so. This is well known by many working within
the field of AI, though it is a point at risk of being overlooked by
implementing organizations in the public and private sector. The
model that law takes when enshrined in the infrastructure of technology also has certain consequences for the rule of law. These are issues
we discuss further in Part III.
III. THE RULE OF (MACHINE-MADE) LAW
Efforts to measure the strength of the rule of law in a particular
jurisdiction have varied in respect to method and focus. In line with
the United Nation’s approach,185 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) method of evaluation relies on institutional features that install the conditions necessary for the rule of
law to flourish.186 Accordingly, objective indicators of progress, such as
the creation of legal guarantees of due process or a legal framework to
guarantee impartiality of the judiciary, are favored over evaluation as

184. See, e.g., Zeleznikow & Stranieri, supra note 12, at 185.
185. UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW INDICATORS:
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND PROJECT TOOLS (2011).
186. BERENSCHOT & IMAGOS, THEMATIC EVALUATION OF RULE OF LAW, JUDICIAL
REFORM AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ORGANISED CRIME IN THE WESTERN
BALKANS–LOT 3 (2013); OECD, EVALUATION OF GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, JUDICIARY
REFORM AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ORGANISED CRIME IN THE WESTERN BALKANS:
LOT 2–FINAL REPORT (2012).

2020]

THE DEVIL IN THE DETAIL

71

to whether adherence to these legal requirements occurs in practice.187
This top-down institutional focus does not consider what the citizenexperience of justice might reveal about the state of the rule of law in
a jurisdiction. Structural reforms intended to enhance the rule of law
speak to intent but not to operability, which can only be understood in
the context of the experience of justice.188
Increasingly, calls have been made to recognize bottom-up indicators that provide qualitative and experiential insight into how the rule
of law is actualized in practice by those subject to the law.189 For an
individual, taking formal action to enforce a right is only likely to merit
the effort if the system within which interpretation and enforcement
occurs is perceived to be functional, impartial, fair, and accessible.
These perceptions color informal dispute resolution, which is said to
occur in the “shadow of the law,” with parties having reference to the
likely interpretation/sanction imposed by the court. 190 By extension,
issues are resolved not just in the “shadow of the law,” but in the
“shadow of the rule of law,” with parties considering the functionality,
impartiality, fairness, and accessibility of institutions trusted to make
decisions. Formal systems governed by weak legal order have a flow
on effects reflected in the “private ordering” that occurs in relation to
informal dispute resolution.191
For AI, both the top-down (structural/institutional/constitutional/
formal) and bottom-up (experiential) dimensions of the rule of law are
of importance. The potential of AI as a means by which to improve
justice must be assessed with reference to the institutional and experiential rule of law impact as well as the distribution of this impact. In
187. See. e.g., BERENSCHOT & IMAGOS, supra note 190, at 35–36; OECD, supra note 190,
at 16–20; MARTIN GRAMATIKOV & RONALD JANSE, CONCEPT PAPER: MONITORING AND
EVALUATION OF THE RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE EU: STATUS QUO AND THE WAY
AHEAD? 6–8 (2012).
188. See GRAMATIKOV & JANSE, supra note 187, at 9.
189. See, e.g., The World Justice Project: General Population 2016–Opinion poll, WORLD
JUSTICE PROJECT (2016), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/gpp_
questionnaire_2016_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W64L-LTNY] (describing the World Justice
Index—an effort to derive a more subjective citizen-centric sociologically based insight by
drawing on public perceptions of the likely outcome in different hypothetical scenarios so as
to construct an understanding of the prevailing legal order).
190. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
191. Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 398 (2012) [hereinafter Genn, What is Civil Justice For?]. As Genn
explains,
Authoritative judicial determination has a critical public function in common-law
systems, creating the framework or the ‘shadow’ in which the settlement of disputes
can be achieved. That it is underpinned by the coercive power of the state provides
the background threat that brings unwilling litigants to the negotiating table and
makes it possible for weaker parties to enforce their rights and to expose wrongdoing.
Id.
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the section that follows we consider the key rule of law considerations
that are raised in the application of AI to law. We look specifically at
the capacity of AI to balance procedural versus substantive justice, and
to enhance (or undermine) the neutrality, transparency, and accessibility of the legal system, and the autonomy of legal agents.
A. Substantive versus Procedural Justice
A key structural dimension of the rule of the law is the way in which
legal outcomes balance procedural versus substantive justice. Whilst
procedural justice is enshrined in the rules that govern how the law is
made and applied, substantive justice is bound in the consequences
that derive from this process of “making” or “applying.” These goals
are diametrically opposed. To permit a higher degree of substantive
justice is to permit a lower degree of procedural justice.192 Whilst for
some, (notably Jerome Frank) substantive justice is viewed as taking
priority such that where justice and the rule of law diverge; “the rule
of law is pernicious to the extent that it detracts from achieving justice.”193 For others, such as Robert H. Bork, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes substantive justice other than by “reference to some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or
intrinsic validity of its own and about which men can and do differ.”194
On this view, adherence to the procedural constraints of the rule of law
is the closest to what we might call “objective” justice.195
If, as has been argued, procedure is more important than outcome,
then rule-based AI systems offer a means by which to safeguard consistency of legal decision-making and provide a level of certainty in the
law that does not exist at present. Such systems would operate to emphasize the scientific character of the law in which key dimensions of
the rule of law, namely conformity to reason, uniformity, and certitude
are prioritized above all else.196 Indeed, there are those who advocate
rule-based reasoning as a means of enhancing the rule of law, observing the scientific (formalistic) character of law as the only path
by which to safeguard full, equal, and exact justice. 197 Rule-based
judgment systems may have the effect of instigating a shift away
from what D’Amato describes as living under the rule of persons, as
opposed to living under the rule of law.198 But in evaluating the merits
192. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 598–99.
193. Id. at 597–98 (paraphrasing Jerome Frank).
194. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 10 (1971).
195. Barnett, supra note 20, at 598.
196. But see Marcin Matczak, Why Judicial Formalism is Incompatible with the Rule of
Law, 31 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 61, 63 (2018).
197. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908).
198. Bork, supra note 198, at 10.
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of this approach, we must consider whether all that is lost when we
remove the humanness of legal judgment is the institutionalization of
arbitrariness, discretion, and/or bias.199
The impact of this loss turns on whether the ends (fair outcomes)
are seen to occupy a position of greater importance than the means
(consistent procedure). Although the flexibility that we come to associate with human judgment generates a degree of uncertainty and
ambiguity, it may also fulfill a positive function in the application and
interpretation of law. Firstly, because it enables “just” outcomes to be
reached, and secondly, because legal evolution relies on this discretion,
allowing legal interpretation to act in reflection of and reaction to
broader social change. 200 The architecture of rule-based reasoning
systems is such that all the information must be contained within the
system from the start. Such systems cannot respond to the evolution
of the law without requiring frequent rebuilding, nor would evolution
of the law be permitted if formal systems were to replace the existing
legal ecology. There is reason to be cautious of making the law into a
system of rules in the service of technology, 201 such that we might
concede, as Weizenbaum has done, that although computers can make
judicial decisions, they ought not be given such tasks. 202 Crucially,
despite their ability to learn, it is not clear that machine-learning tools
escape these issues of legal stagnancy, and in fact, when developed for
the purpose of legal decision-making, may only serve to exacerbate
stagnancy by rendering new outcomes a facsimile of those that have
gone before.
B. Institutionalizing Bias
As a tool to assist legal decision makers, the predictions derived
from data-driven systems offer insight into factors that influence an
outcome. But whilst they may operate as a form of system monitoring,
capable of flagging up administrative or judicial decisions that suspiciously diverge from previous decisions, they also present a degree of
risk. Although ML methods are not numerically stagnant, as Bayesian
approaches enable “rules” (as defined by the numerical relationships
or weights between inputs and outputs) to update upon receipt of new
data (in the form of new case decisions 203 ), ML systems can be
199. Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277,
1279 (1977).
200. See, e.g., id. at 1281; Pound, supra note 197, at 606.
201. Carl F. Stover, Technology and Law—A Look Ahead, 4 M.U.L.L. MOD. USES LOGIC
L. 1, 4–5 (1963).
202. POPPLE, supra note 78, at 10, 52 n.42 (citing JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER
POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO CALCULATION 226–27 (1976)).
203. See generally DAVID BARBER, BAYESIAN REASONING AND MACHINE LEARNING
(2012).
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functionally stagnant, representing a self-fulfilling prophecy of
sorts. 204 Realists argue that legal interpretation is the product of a
whole range of different factors, only some of which are rooted in
deductive or analogical reasoning.205 Producing a ML model that determines the outcome of a case by replicating the influence of certain
factors in existing data acts only to propagate similar such outcomes.206
In other words, data can encode biases due to the human decisions
that this data represents, and ML reliant on this data can operate to
institutionalize this bias. 207 Whilst claims of “biased” computer programs suggest an ethical failure on behalf of designers, such problems
may more commonly reflect methodological and technical issues with
data, only some of which might be avoidable. So, whilst ML has the
potential to eliminate bias from decision-making, allowing for models
to be tweaked by reducing the effect of certain irrelevant characteristics on an outcome,208 this assumes that the underlying data is not
compromised (biased) through improper sampling, collection, or
simply because those using it have failed to appreciate the systemic or
historic inequalities it reflects.209
The likelihood of institutionalizing bias within a model bias is not
so remote. Widely used criminal risk prediction software in the U.S.
204. See generally Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities,
Preserving Values, Washington, D.C., (May 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9V8BZCGR].
205. See generally Pound, Theories of Law, supra note 20, at 114–16; Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 20, at 261.
206. See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, supra note 208; Bennett-Moses & Chan,
supra note 96, at 648; Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) & Cabinet Office, Interim Report: Review into Bias in Algorithmic Decision-Making (last updated July 25, 2019),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/interim-reports-from-the-centre-for-data-ethics-and-innovation/interim-report-review-into-bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making [https://
perma.cc/5TZF-WB5X].
207. See generally Chris DeBrusk, The Risk of Machine-Learning Bias (and How to
Prevent It), MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/therisk-of-machine-learning-bias-and-how-to-prevent-it [https://perma.cc/TF59-GNU8]; Will
Knight, Forget Killer Robots—Bias is the Real AI Danger, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608986/forget-killer-robotsbias-is-the-real-ai-danger/
[https://perma.cc/PP5V-VPJW]; Hannah Devlin, AI Programs Exhibit Racial and Gender
Biases, Research Reveals, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/apr/13/ai-programs-exhibit-racist-and-sexist-biases-research-reveals
[https://perma.cc/LYY6-PXC3]; OSONDE OSOBA & WILLIAM WELSER IV, AN INTELLIGENCE IN
OUR IMAGE: THE RISKS OF BIAS AND ERRORS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2017).
208. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of
Fairness, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 797, 805 (2017) (on the use of constrained
optimization techniques to impose algorithmic fairness).
209. Monika Ermert, WEF Davos: Who Will Own the Knowledge Produced from “Our”
Data by Machines?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/
2017/01/18/wef-davos-will-knowledge-produced-data-machines/
[https://perma.cc/Q98FEV6Z].
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has already been shown to routinely assign higher levels of risk to the
assessments of black subjects.210 This is also true in respect of NLP,
where the gendered nature of language has ramifications for the models produced from natural language data.211 While the detection and
removal of bias from text is an active area of research,212 the issue of
latent bias in NLP is far from solved. Similar such challenges arise in
the application of AI to the fields of finance and medicine, where there
is the potential for AI agents to inadvertently discriminate against a
loan applicant or a medical patient on the basis of age, gender, sexuality, etc.213 Moreover, in crime detection and enforcement, the implications arising from the imposition of certain technologies may run counter to the goal the technology is intended to achieve. Predictive policing
software that identifies crime hot-spots risks reinforcing a vicious
cycle of increased police presence in neighborhoods already subject to
over-policing. 214 These flaws can be understood if we recognize the
method being used to develop the software, but they are not necessarily straightforward to pinpoint where the complexity of a model
hinders its explainability, or the commercial interests of a developer
inhibits disclosure and restricts transparency.215
210. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://
perma.cc/NC5S-L79Y].
211. Tolga Bolukbasi et al., Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to
Homemaker? Debiasing Word Embeddings, in 30TH CONFERENCE ON NEURAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING SYSTEMS 4356 (2016); Aylin Caliskan et al., Semantics Derived Automatically
from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases, 356 SCIENCE 183, 184–85 (2017); Su
Lin Blodgett & Brendan O’Connor, Racial Disparity in Natural Language Processing: A Case
Study of Social Media African-American English, in FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE LEARNING (FAT/ML) WORKSHOP (2017); Rachael Tatman,
Gender and Dialect Bias in YouTube’s Automatic Captions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
WORKSHOP ON ETHICS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 53, 57 (2017).
212. See e.g., Marta Recasens et al., Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting
Biased Language, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION
FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS (VOLUME 1: LONG PAPERS) 1650 (2013); Liye Fu et al., TieBreaker: Using Language Models to Quantify Gender Bias in Sports Journalism, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IJCAI WORKSHOP ON NLP MEETS JOURNALISM 1 (2016).
213. Danton S. Char et al., Implementing Machine Learning in Health Care–Addressing
Ethical Challenges, 378 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 981, 981–83 (2018) (discussing such inadvertent
discrimination in the medical field).
214. See, e.g., P. Jeffrey Brantingham et al., Does Predictive Policing Lead to Biased
Arrests? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 5 STAT. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–6 (2018);
Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing, in 81 PROCEEDINGS
OF MACHINE LEARNING RESEARCH: CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
TRANSPARENCY 1, 2 (2018).
215. Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-whiteguy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/58NX-AKKV]; Katherine Freeman, Algorithmic
Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v.
Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2016); Ellora Israni, Algorithmic Due Process: Mistaken
Accountability and Attribution in State v. Loomis, JOLT DIGEST (Aug. 31 2017),
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C. Transparency
The transparency of legal decision-making plays a crucial role in
shaping public perceptions of the fairness of the justice system.
It speaks to the perceived structural and experiential integrity of
the legal system and operates as a barometer for the relative strength
of the rule of law. AI, particularly ML, raises concerns regarding
the explainability and robustness of the decisions made. Automated
decision-making systems implemented with the intent of facilitating
access to justice by enhancing consistency may in practice operate as
a barrier to the obtainment of fair outcomes. This risk can arise as a
function of design or of implementation, with the latter risk magnified
where the process by which automated decisions are reached are
procedurally and substantively different from those processes adhered
to by human decision-makers.216
Thus, there is particular concern associated with applying deep
learning in certain contexts (including law) where explainability is
key, as the outcomes produced cannot always be clearly and systematically interpreted.217 It may be difficult for a clinician to explain to a
patient why they have been given a prognosis of five years to live rather than ten as expected, just as it may be difficult for a loan officer
to justify the denial of a loan to a prospective customer without a substantive basis for doing so. Similarly, a decision to find a defendant
guilty, or to sentence someone to more than the average incarceration
period for a particular crime, needs to be supported with clear reasons.
The use of such algorithms in a public or private administrative capacity (e.g., to determine access to legal aid, to determine access to the
entitlements of citizenship, to vet potential employees, or to assess an
applicant’s credit risk), involves interaction with the law and with
characteristics protected by law. These are the sorts of protections that
can be easily (deliberately or inadvertently) subverted by machine
decision-making, and ascribing responsibility for failure may prove
difficult.
There are also constraints imposed as a result of technological
infrastructures. For example, accuracy in ML is based on the raw
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/algorithmic-due-process-mistaken-accountability-andattribution-in-state-v-loomis-1 [https://perma.cc/VFF8-QZ39].
216. As shown in an inquiry into the Australian Department of Human Services (DHS)
“Online Compliance Intervention” (OCI) system, launched in July 2016 to detect discrepancies between the income welfare benefit clients reported to DHS and the income they reported to the Australian Tax Office (ATO). This revealed that whilst the algorithm employed
to identify inconsistencies replicated the calculations of human decision makers, the information that informed a calculation was qualitatively different. See AMIE MEERS ET AL., supra
note 164, at 4.
217. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BIOETHICS BRIEFING NOTE: AI IN HEALTHCARE
AND RESEARCH 1, 4 (May 2018), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/briefing-notes/artificialintelligence-ai-healthcare-research [https://perma.cc/4GAQ-8KNH].
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prediction performance of an algorithm exposed to “unseen data” (or
new cases/combinations of facts) as compared to accuracy achieved in
other similar such studies.218 It is not always possible to achieve 100%
accuracy, and some level of inaccuracy is always accepted. In instances
where an algorithm is charged with determining whether a picture is
of a cat or a dog, the ramifications of an error (at least in the abstract)
are relatively minor. However, the impact of error is of far greater
magnitude in regard to legal decision-making, particularly where
systems fulfill a “gatekeeping” function. Whilst a right to explanation
exists in the U.S. in relation to credit score,219 it is not clear the extent
to which the right exists in relation to other forms of administrative
decision-making.220 Certainly if the court’s decision in State v. Loomis
is indicative, that right might extend only to ensuring that decisionmakers (as opposed to subjects) are provided with a written warning
as to the dangers of reliance on certain algorithmic assessments.221
These issues force us to consider the level of machine error we are willing to accept given that this machine error compounds any existing
human error in the labeled data on which an algorithm is trained.
D. Access to Justice
Access to justice is taken to mean access to the institutions of justice,
such as courts, dispute resolution services, administrative appeal
mechanisms to legal services, access to knowledge about one’s rights,
entitlements and obligations, and the ability (personal or structural)
to exercise those rights and uphold those responsibilities. 222 Open
218. Foster Provost et al., The Case Against Accuracy Estimation for Comparing Induction Algorithms, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MACHINE LEARNING 445–453 (1998). This is particularly common when research is carried
out on well-known tasks on publicly available datasets (as often happens in the field of
computer vision, for example). See, e.g., Richard Dinga et al., Beyond Accuracy: Measures
For Assessing Machine Learning Models, Pitfalls and Guidelines, BIORXIV (Aug. 22, 2019),
biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/743138v1 [https://perma.cc/YJ4G-XDDJ].
219. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512, 5581 (2012).
220. Similarly, although the General Data Protection Regulations offer some safeguards
to EU residents by restricting automated decision-making and creating a right to explanation, the range of limitations and exceptions that apply have been roundly critiqued. See
Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 180, at 55; Maja Brkan, AI-Supported Decision-Making
under the General Data Protection Regulation, in 617 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 3, 5 (2017).
221. 881 N.W.2d 749, 767 (Wis. 2016) (deciding whether failure to reveal the basis of
proprietary risk assessment software used in sentencing violated the defendant’s due process
rights).
222. Whilst acknowledging that “in practice access to justice defies definition” and is
“used as a handle to justify all sorts of policies designed to have quite different outcomes,”
Hazel Genn provides the following definition:
At its most basic it is about access to procedures for making rights effective
through state-sponsored public and fair dispute resolution processes. It implies
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access to the courts is of critical importance—courts operate to uphold
standards of behavior, which in turn frame the informal application,
interpretation, and enforcement of law.223 Courts are the only means
by which to legitimize the threat of enforcement and the view that real
or perceived consequences may actually arise.224 Yet, whilst access to
(formal and informal) adjudication systems are important, mere access
is not sufficient if would-be users lack the knowledge and capacity to
make use of this access.225 In practice, access requires that the public
have the requisite knowledge, understanding, confidence, and capability to pursue or defend a legal claim—with or without professional
assistance.
To date, much has been said about the capacity for AI tools to aid
in facilitating access to justice; either through increasing public
knowledge of the law, democratizing access to the legal services
market by reducing costs, and/or increasing the capacity of adjudicative institutions to handle claims by making processes more efficient. 226 Indeed, a number of examples previously provided suggest
progress in these areas. Further, as-yet unrealized ambitions to use
NLP techniques to translate (user) natural language to the legalese
required in a “particulars of claim” statement, to fill out a court
document, or to automate points of contest in a negotiation, represent
a natural evolution of much of the AI and law work already done. Yet,
despite much talk about the potential utility of AI systems in providing
equal access to authoritative enforceable rulings and outcomes that reflect the
merits of the case in light of relevant legal principles. It does not imply that laws
are necessarily just, but that individuals have a fair opportunity for their rights
to be determined according to the prevailing promulgated rules.
HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE 115 (2010) [hereinafter GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE].
See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DAEDALUS 49, 50 (2019) (More recently,
Sandefur has proposed “[t]here is access when disputes and problems governed by civil law . . .
resolve with results that satisfy legal norms.”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2004).
223. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 190, at 990–92.
224. As Genn explains,
Authoritative judicial determination has a critical public function in commonlaw systems, creating the framework or the “shadow” in which the settlement of
disputes can be achieved. That it is underpinned by the coercive power of the
state provides the background threat that brings unwilling litigants to the negotiating table and makes it possible for weaker parties to enforce their rights and
to expose wrongdoing.
Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 158, at 398. Genn further explains, “While the
reality is that most cases settle, a flow of adjudicated cases is necessary to provide guidance
on the law and, most importantly, to create the credible threat of litigation if settlement is
not achieved.” GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 222, at 21.
225. Rt. Hon Lord Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 20, at 6.
226. See, e.g., ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 127, at 3;
RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS (2015).
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advice and support in the civil justice resolution process, there are
no obvious examples where these ambitions have been realized.227
The “trickle down” benefits of AI in democratizing access to legal
services for individual consumers of modest means, has been minimal
at best. Indeed, in some cases AI may actively (though not always obviously) undermine efforts to widen access to justice. Tools that predict
the likely success of the case may diminish a lawyer’s willingness to
represent a client in court, no matter how important the cause. Such
information may also influence the likelihood of a plaintiff’s ability to
secure third party financing—a phenomenon that has emerged over
the last decade and is particularly prominent in class action and tort
cases.228 Rule-based or data-driven systems implemented as a gateway
to accessing a court (with or without representation) also generate
further cause for concern. These technologies represent efficiency
gains for certain actors (usually law firms or government agencies)
rather than mechanisms by which justice may be made more accessible to the public.229 As a result, they call into question the effect AI may
have in distorting equality of arms.
The use of AI in law also raises a series of existential questions
regarding the purpose of law. If AI affects a shift in the locus of legal
decision-making from humans to technology, what role is there for law
to remain the “primary instrument to guide and sustain legitimate
expectations between those who share jurisdiction”? 230 Where AI is
charged with moderating interactions between actors (customers,
clients, citizens) and agents (businesses, government, organizations),
technology may displace the function of the law in setting legitimate
expectations to guide shadow bargaining. In such instances, bargaining no longer takes place in the shadow of the law but in the shadow
of automated decision-making infrastructures. By extension, success
may have less to do with legal merit and more to do with the likelihood

227. For example, in Sandefur’s review of 322 access to justice technologies intended for
non-lawyers, only two purported to use AI technology, with a further one indicating an intention to draw on AI in the development of the software. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, LEGAL
TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF US TECHNOLOGIES 31, 53, 57 (2019).
228. Jason Krause, Third-party financing is growing, and lawyers are big players, ABA
J. (July 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/%0Barticle/third_party_financing_
is_growing_and_lawyers_are_big_players [https://perma.cc/EWP9-CKEQ].
229. For example, the related example produced by the UK government’s introduction of
a telephone gateway for access to legal aid in 2012. Although not AI enhanced, the gateway
was variously accused of creating a hurdle to access to justice. Ben Hickman & David Oldfield, Keys to the Gateway: An Independent Review of the Mandatory Civil Legal Advice
Gateway, PUB. L. PROJECT (2015), https://publiclawproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/
data/resources/199/Keys-to-the-Gateway-An-Independent-Review-of-the-Mandatory-CLAGateway.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JXS-VWXY].
230. Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency, 79
MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2016).
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of overturning an automated decision-making process.231 Such issues,
particularly where they involve inequality of arms between parties
and where they relate to “settlement” transactions contingent on an
evaluation of utility and risk/benefit, are likely to undermine bargaining power. This has the effect of displacing the procedural function of
the rule of law that exists to enable people to stand up for their rights232
and the due process protections enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
More perverse are applications where Big Data is used to gain
advantage by exploiting weaknesses in the prevailing legal order. For
example, in Article 33 of the Justice Reform Act France recently
banned using Big Data about judges to exploit systemic bias and gain
an advantage over adversaries.233
Where AI systems extend to bargaining processes, bargaining
becomes oriented around arriving at an outcome rather than a just
outcome234 and further, runs the risk of equating the value of bargaining/negotiation with the value of the agreement reached. Such tools
might increase the likelihood of parties reaching an agreement by
ensuring a solution in all instances in which parties exhibit overlapping bargaining ranges, but at what cost for procedural justice
or perceptions of fairness? Individuals are said to care deeply about
the process by which an outcome is reached, 235 and automated
systems are likely to not only render these processes opaque, but to
subsequently diminish belief in the fairness of the steps by which a
decision has been made. Such tools, whether deployed in or outside of
231. See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an
Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46, 51–52 (2018)
(discussing the “right to an explanation” in the context of data protection and subject access
requests).
232. Id. at 2.
233. Loi 2019–222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018–2022 et de réforme pour la
justice [Law 2019-222 of Mar. 23, 2019 on the Reform of Justice], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 21, 2019, Article 33
(stating that “[t]he identity data of magistrates and members of the Registry cannot be reused with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analyzing, comparing or predicting their actual
or alleged professional practices.”).
234. This parallels the “anti-adjudication and anti-law discourse” implicit in policy reforms occurring in the UK from the 1980s onwards, which has seen access to justice reframed
as access to an outcome and which has instigated a shift away from access to formal legal
structures towards mediation and alternative dispute resolution. Genn, What is Civil Justice
For?, supra note 191, at 409. As a result, Genn argues that access to justice has been redefined not as access to the courts or to a “just settlement” but as access to a “settlement”—
as demonstrated by the fact that mediators do not make a judgment about the quality of the
settlement. Id. at 411. The same is true of bargaining systems, which are not focused on
matters of fairness, but rather on expedience of settlement. See, e.g., Julia Hörnle, Encouraging Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond, 38 EUR. L. REV 187, 208 (2013) (taking issue with systems which prioritize efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and automation at the
expense of due process).
239. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 477 (2008).
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the negotiation context, might also be seen to encroach on legal agency
given that the exercise of justice and access to it becomes bound by the
parameters set by technology designers and/or the limits of a given
technology. As Pound has noted, “The effect of all system is apt to be
petrifaction of the subject systematized.”236
E. Legal Agency and the Distribution of Benefits
Legal agents have been described as “participant in a distinctly
constituted social condition” within which they are constituted as
“responsible persons” capable of engaging in “purposive action . . . understand[ing] and follow[ing] practical standards,” and “accountable
for the decisions they make with respect to what the law requires of
them.”237 Those who design and implement legal AI systems do so in
order to further a particular agenda, undermining the aspiration that
the law might exist as a neutral mechanism balancing competing
interests in society. AI systems have the potential to diminish agency
by requiring that bargaining/application/adjudication occurs in conformance with the constraints of a particular system or process. When
the choice to make a decision is removed or when decisions amount
to nothing more than a fait accompli, in which no space is given to
revision, reflection, or debate, then personal agency is necessarily
constrained. Behavior mediated via data-driven systems with their
own form of agency is not independently exercised.238
Law is not merely information about the legal effect of one’s
behaviors, but an agent that gives substance to that effect. The idea of
prospectivity as a fundamental feature of the rule of law implies that
those subject to the law should be capable of anticipating the legal
effect of their actions. Yet as Hildebrand observes, data-driven techniques are used more often to anticipate and pre-empt the behavior of
legal subjects and as such these tools inform the likelihood of taking
an action and not the implications of doing so.239 That AI tools may
operate to constrain autonomy and limit agency is of fundamental
concern given that the creation, interpretation, application, and
enforcement of law draws legitimacy from the presumed autonomy of
the actors involved. In a rule of law context, these issues speak to

236. Pound, supra note 197, at 608.
237. Stefano Bertea, Legal Form and Agency: Variations on Two Central Themes in
Fuller’s Legal Theory, 5 JURIS. 96, 98 (2014).
238. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL
ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2015).
239. Id.; Hildebrandt, supra note 230, at 10.
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where accountability might vest for mistakes or poor judgment, as
well as highlighting those for whom the rewards of AI are likely to
accumulate.240
Asking who is likely to benefit from the implementation of AI in
different settings and what this benefit entails, is key to understanding the potential implications of that implementation on legal agency
and outcome. In medicine, the lines appear more clear-cut. Benefit is
defined as that which prolongs life and minimizes suffering. To this
end, AI has been used to model the underlying causes of diseases,241
churn through biomedical research papers and flag compounds which
may be cures to a given disease,242 classify specific genes according
to their role in disease development, 243 and analyze biomolecular
structure.244 It has also been used in diagnostic settings in conjunction
with radiology and ultrasound,245 to detect brain tumors,246 quantify
risk of Alzheimer’s,247 diagnose liver diseases,248 recognize malignant
prostate tissue, 249 analyze retinal scans, 250 and construct models of
the heart to predict survival chances for patients with pulmonary

240. Extending legal personhood to AI has heralded calls for further exploration of the
legal status of autonomous agents and clarification regarding the status, rights, and obligations of “electronic personalities.” See, e.g., Argyro Karanasiou & Dimitris Pinotsis, Towards
a Legal Definition of Machine Intelligence: The Argument for Artificial Personhood in the Age
of Deep Learning, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119 (2017).
241. See, e.g., Publications, BERG, https://berghealth.com/publications/ [https://perma.
cc/S73Q-XNRM].
242. See Ken Mulvany, Developing Pharmaceuticals Efficiently with Artificial
Intelligence, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/developingpharmaceuticals-efficiently-artificial-intelligence-1664431 [https://perma.cc/6N3Y-8575].
243. See WuXi NextCODE, Artificial Intelligence Used to Advance Precision Therapy
for Rare Genetic Disorders of Obesity, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/wuxi-nextcode-artificial-intelligence-used-to-advanceprecision-therapy-for-rare-genetic-disorders-of-obesity-300579919.html
[https://perma.cc/
RB44-SXK2].
244. See Nic Fleming, Computer-Calculated Compounds, 557 NATURE 55, 57 (2018).
245. See SANKETH VEDULA ET AL., TOWARDS CT-QUALITY ULTRASOUND IMAGING USING
DEEP LEARNING (2017).
250. See Guotai Wang et al., Automatic Brain Tumor Segmentation using Cascaded
Anisotropic Convolutional Neural Networks, in MICCAI BRAINLESION WORKSHOP 178
(2017).
247. Ammarah Farooq et al., A Deep CNN Based Multi-Class Classification of
Alzheimer’s Disease Using MRI, in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMAGING
SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES 1, 2 (2017).
248. See Koichi Ogawa et al., Computer-Aided Diagnostic System for Diffuse Liver
Diseases with Ultrasonography by Neural Networks, 45 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR
SCI. 3069, 3069 (1998).
249. See Tillman Loch et al., Artificial Neural Network Analysis (ANNA) of Prostatic
Transrectal Ultrasound, 39 PROSTATE 198, 200 (1999).
250. See Jeffrey De Fauw et al., Automated Analysis of Retinal Imaging Using Machine
Learning Techniques for Computer Vision, 5 F1000RESEARCH 1573 (2016).
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hypertension. 251 On the face of it, these implementations appear to
serve the interests of the public, but a closer assessment might call
into question the disruptive effect of these tools on existing ecologies.
In medicine as in law, the advice giving/treatment process relies upon
a functioning lawyer-client/doctor-patient relationship. A third-party
actor in the form of an ML model may complicate this interpersonal
connection and weaken the strength of communication. As with most
technological innovation, some stakeholders are likely to benefit from
the implementation of AI in certain contexts more than others.252
AI in law has been driven by those with the most to gain from its
introduction. This has implicated corporate law firms who have mobilized AI tools to increase efficiency, protect profit margins, and
increase the ratio of support staff, relative to qualified legal staff.
This concentration of activity by corporate stakeholders reflects stark
investment realities as to who has the capital and incentive to invest.
These pragmatic constraints only serve to reinforce how the benefits
of AI may be unequally distributed.253 In the public sector, this imbalance may see enhanced efficiency at the cost of diminished fairness,
with the interests of government (spend reduction) prioritized over the
interests of justice.254 Elsewhere, the imbalance may enable a third
255. See Timothy J.W. Dawes et al., Machine Learning of Three-dimensional Right
Ventricular Motion Enables Outcome Prediction in Pulmonary Hypertension: A Cardiac MR
Imaging Study, 283 RADIOLOGY 381, 382 (2017).
252. In respect of medicine the response of the Royal College of General Practitioners to
Babylon Health’s publication is informative. See Royal College of General Practitioners,
Apps and Algorithms May “Support but will Never Replace” GPs, Says RCGP, RCGP
NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://www.rcgp.org.uk/about-us/news/2018/june/apps-andalgorithms-may-support-but-will-never-replace-gps-says-rcgp.aspx [https://perma.cc/7VVV52JV] (suggesting that Babylon’s service “cherry-picks” more straightforward patients, due
to the bias in those who can access the app).
253. In some cases, the “access to justice” angle appears to be a detour on the road to
commercialisation. In 2016 software start-up LawGeex invited the public to upload their
employment contracts so that software could scan the contracts so as to identify unusual
contract terms or conditions, in what was framed as an access to justice offer. See LawGeex
Now Reviews Employment Contracts Free, LawGeex (Apr. 19, 2016), https://web.archive.org/
web/20160807140250/http://blog.lawgeex.com:80/lawgeex-now-reviews-employmentcontracts-free/ [https://perma.cc/6FCM-KJL8] (‘The more contracts that we review, the better our machine learning algorithms get, and the more people we can help.”). The offer was
short-lived, as their website now returns a 409 error and with no evidence that this personal
option is still available. See Not Found, Error 404, LAWGEEX, http://blog.lawgeex.com/lawgeex-now-reviews-employment-contracts-free/ [https://perma.cc/75WZ-DHA7].
254. As demonstrated by the Australian Department of Human Services (DHS) “Online
Compliance Intervention” (OCI) system launched in July 2016. MEERS ET AL., supra note
183, at 1. The system was designed to automate the investigation and debt raising process
where DHS detected a discrepancy between the amount of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) income
reported to DHS (in respect of welfare benefit receipt) and the amount of PAYG income reported to the Australian Tax Office (ATO). Id. Intended to increase the capacity for discrepancy identification and investigation beyond the level achievable via human oversight, the
system generated an exponential increase in the number of discrepancies identified. Id. Sustained public criticism emerged as to the transparency, fairness, and usability of the system
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party to benefit at the expense of others. Whilst the AI enhanced-eBay
dispute resolution system is routinely lauded, it is worth noting that
most disputes end in negative feedback being left, followed by termination of the bargain.255 This negates most of the economic benefits of
the transaction whilst increasing the cost of bargaining by way of
inconvenience/postage costs/transaction fees incurred.
Although AI and the increased automation it facilitates may reduce
bias, corruption, inefficiency, inconsistency, and inaccessibility, the
efficacy of a particular technology remains contingent on the broader
eco-system within which it is deployed and to whom it is made accessible. As Hildebrand proposes “algorithms to delve and further develop
legal knowledge should primarily serve those subject to the law, not
first and foremost those administering the law” 256 and should be
available to all, rather than “restricted to those willing and able to pay
the fees of the corporate law firms that have the capital to invest.”257
F. Assessing Risk versus Benefit
For those who perceive the law as a reflection of the personal views
of those people in charge of enacting, applying, and enforcing it, legal
rules are “objects of discourse, not objects with a concrete nature.”258
In this context, formalizing the law in a rule-based system, classifying
future cases with reference to historic cases, linguistic corpora, or psychometric data, silences this discourse by removing the space required
for it to thrive. In a constitutional democracy, law sustains the balance
of power between citizens, businesses, and the state, providing a
and the vulnerable user-group subject to OCI debt notifications. Id. at 2. The resulting Senate inquiry revealed that whilst the algorithmic calculation employed to identify inconsistencies replicated that of human decision makers, the information that informed a calculation
was qualitatively different. Id. Human investigators were required to attempt “every possible means of obtaining the actual income information.” Id. at 3. Under OCI the onus for
providing information rested on the claimant, and where that onus was not discharged
within a specified timeframe, averaged ATO income was used to calculate debt owing. Id.
This averaging was necessary in order to achieve the underlying efficiency objective the tool
was intended to introduce. Id. at 4.
To enable it to automate debt raising in situations where earnings information was
not forthcoming from the customer, DHS decided to accept the best already available
evidence to calculate an approximate debt figure by averaging ATO data, rather than
using its information gathering powers to obtain verified fortnightly data to calculate
an exact debt figure. This decision was fundamental to the efficiency and scale of the
system, because it meant that compliance officers did not have to manually intervene
to obtain fortnightly payroll data.
Id. at 4.
255. Lilian Edwards & Ashley Theunissen, Creating Trust and Satisfaction Online: How
Important is ADR? The UK eBay Experience, in 21ST BILETA CONFERENCE: GLOBALISATION
AND HARMONISATION IN TECHNOLOGY LAW 1, 16 (2006).
256. Hildebrandt, supra note 230, at 10.
257. Id. at 11.
258. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 45, at 548.
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structure within which agents in society can interact. The fact that
technology also has the power to regulate these interactions implies
that “legal and technological instruments are not exchangeable tools
to achieve specific policy objectives, depending on which tool is more
efficient or effective.”259 Adopting such an attitude puts us at risk of a
system in which technology displaces the regulatory power of the
law—governing the law itself, rather than being governed by it.260
This necessarily implies a conservative approach to using AI technologies as an instrument by which to safeguard fundamental principles of the rule of law. It also urges caution in assuming that such
technologies can improve the institutional and structural integrity
of legal systems, without the need for further (human) checks and
balances. This is particularly relevant given that AI models of law are
necessarily constrained by the limits of what is technologically possible at the point of development. Whilst ordinarily the law operates to
constrain technology, any effort to enshrine the “law” in an AI system
necessarily allows this technology to constrain the interpretation,
application, and enforcement of the law. The law cannot be seen to
exist as separate from the apparatus that gives it effect. Where that
apparatus is technology, the subject of embodiment (“the law”)
becomes defined by reference to what the object of embodiment (the
technological architecture) makes possible.
Recognizing this, and the model of law imposed by a particular AI
system, is of value in determining the impact that might result from
implementation. However, introspection tends to follow rather than
precede implementation past the point at which the influence of that
technology has already taken hold. Who has not questioned the validity of a colored squiggly line appearing under a sentence in MS Word,
yet deferred to the system in preference to continuing to work under
an accusation of grammatical ineptitude? This pervasive influence
leads McGee and Eriksson to refer to MS Word as “the invisible
grammarian”261 and reinforces the prescience of Weiser’s 1991 claim
that “The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.”262 It is only upon reflection we can start to see
what might have been possible were we more alive to developments as
they occurred.

259. Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES:
LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 175, 178 (Roger
Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008).
260. Id. at 178–80.
261. Tim McGee & Patricia Ericsson, The Politics Of The Program: MS WORD as the
Invisible Grammarian, 19 COMPUTERS & COMPOSITION 453, 466 (2002).
262. Mark Weiser, The Computer for the 21st Century, 265 SCI. AM. 94, 94 (1991).
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Our analysis of the rule of law impact of AI has necessarily adopted
a critical tone, looking more forcefully at the potential negative rather
than positive effects. That is not to say that AI cannot make a positive
contribution to the functioning of the legal system. Human decision
makers are not infallible, and there are instances where AI can
be used to bolster, rather than undermine, the integrity and operation
of the rule of law. It is certainly feasible that AI could play a role
in remedying defects in the rule of law—democratizing access to
knowledge about rights and the mechanisms by which to enforce these
rights. Tools employed in the public sector may play a role in making
the process of justice more efficient, and in levelling the playing field
rather than distorting it. Certainly, is it not impossible to think the
vast amounts of investment capital flowing into legal technology might
yield dividends for all of society? Nevertheless, we must consider the
underlying objectives to which such tools are directed and the implications attached to the representation of law being adopted in any given
instance. There are a number of pragmatic obstacles that may dictate
an agenda of AI development that serves private interests over and
above public interests. These obstacles, discussed further in Part IV,
provide some insight into the developments we might expect to see
in the coming years, and who is likely to be setting the agenda for
progress.
IV. AGENDAS & OBSTACLES
Discussions as to the role of AI in law tend to occupy two different
ends of the spectrum. Optimists lean towards controversial assertions
that technology will displace lawyers and legal expertise because it is
becoming more advanced year-on-year.263 Whilst the skeptics advance
the view that technology will never be able to undertake the work of a
lawyer because a lawyer’s work involves a complex interplay of different skills.264 Those who argue for the former generally overestimate
the speed of progress and underestimate the challenges. Those who
argue for the latter tend to presume that the job of the lawyer remains
stagnant, or alternatively, perceive incremental change as stagnancy.265 At least for the next decade, if not for the foreseeable future,
pragmatic constraints related to: (A) the commercial incentives, (B)
access to data, and (C) the skills gap, will see the reality of legal
263. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2d ed. 1998); RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE
FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 188, at 68–69.
264. See, e.g., Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers,
Lawyers, and the Practice of Law (Nov. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701092 [https://perma.cc/FWD3-2QJG].
265. Change blindness explains this tendency to overlook changes that would normally
be easily observed. Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink, Change Blindness: Past, Present,
and Future, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 16, 19 (2005).
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technology development fall between these two extremes. In the following section we consider each of these pragmatic constraints in turn.
A. Commercial Incentives
As earlier discussions have revealed, the finance and banking
industry has been seen as an early adopter of AI, particularly when
compared to legal services. This is perhaps not so surprising when we
consider the numerical nature of most of the data involved in finance,
the financial resources available when computing power remained an
expensive commodity, the industry’s access to highly specialized skill
sets (and the ability to pay high salaries to attract talent), and the
strong financial incentives that exist to price assets properly (for
example, options and other derivatives) and predict them into the
future. Early adoption in finance is even less surprising given that
ML represents a natural extension of many of the common technical
analyses conducted by systematic traders in investment banks and
hedge funds.266
By contrast, the technology procurement decisions of law firms
have typically been driven by a desire to avoid the loss of clients or
limit exposure to liability.267 Law is a knowledge-based occupation and
there has been resistance to the idea that this knowledge can or should
be commoditized through the use of technology.268 Moreover, hourlybilling models, only recently eroded by changes to the market, have
arguably disincentivized the pursuit of process efficiencies.269 Yet, in
line with the trends exhibited by their clients, there is growing
expectation that law firms (particularly those in the service of large
financial institutions) will utilize technology. As such, for most organizations who shop around for legal services on the basis of price, the
competitiveness of a quote for legal services will be strongly linked to
the number of man hours versus computer hours required.
In spite of claims of slow uptake, the way in which technology has
been adopted by law firms does not demarcate the legal industry as
uniquely antediluvian. Adoption or pursuit of new technological
advancements across the legal industry have not been homogenous.
Legal service providers have exhibited evidence of engagement at
266. For example, Chen and Lian’s Protrader expert system was able to predict the 87
point drop in Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1986. K.C. Chen & Ting-peng Liang,
PROTRADER: An Expert System for Program Trading, 15 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1, 1 (1989).
267. Legal Technology Insider, No IT Please, We’re Making Enough Money Already!,
LEGAL TECH. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2004), https://www.legaltechnology.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/01/lti160.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMJ3-K5U6].
268. Maurits Barendrecht, Legal Aid, Accessible Courts or Legal Information? Three
Access to Justice Strategies Compared, 2011 GLOBAL JURIST Issue 1, Art. 6, at 12; RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2008).
269. Oskamp & Lauritsen, supra note 2, at 232.

88

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:29

both the incubation and deployment stages, and the timing and extent
of engagement may have less to do with protectionism than is often
suggested. 270 Dickerson, for example, has advanced the view that
larger firms (more than a dozen lawyers) tend to disproportionately
reap the benefits of technology adoption, and this might help explain
why these entities appear to be leading the charge in respect of
technology research and development.271 The adoption or development
of new tools also requires heavy internal investment and an appetite
for risk. These requirements do not necessarily reflect the organizational reality of law and the demand for consensus that the partnership model begets. So, whilst some legal service providers have
invested in software spinouts, this is a strategy that represents a clear
departure from the core business of legal service delivery.272
Doing so also introduces additional risk, since the benefits of
technology adoption are not always clear from the outset. Technology
adoption requires the support of (public, private, and corporate) clients,
and ML can raise particular challenges in implementation. Data
protection requirements and the sensitivities of corporate clients,
particularly financial institutions, means that cloud storage of client
data is often prohibited.273 ML technologies must be hosted on-site, a
solution that vendors (particularly small start-ups) cannot always
offer. Data stored by firms in externally hosted clouds remove a level
of control, and whilst encryption technologies minimize third party
threats, data remains accessible to a cloud host.
Where data does reside in the cloud, there is a further concern regarding intellectual property. ML systems learn from an individual’s
interaction with the system and where a cloud-based solution is used,
an individual is interacting with the software provider’s systems and
servers.274 Not all welcome the fact that software developers benefit
from the expertise of professional users. These intellectual property
considerations also constrain the practicality of joint ventures. Where
cooperation occurs, it does so more often in respect of products that are
270. SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 188, at 67–
68.
271. F. Reed Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, 14 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 485, 487 (1961).
272. See, e.g., Bruce S. Tether, Who Co-Operates for Innovation, and Why? An Empirical
Analysis, 31 RES. POL’Y 947 (2000) (discussing the incentives and disincentives associated
with technology, partnerships, and innovation).
273. See, e.g., Neil Hodge & Ravi Meah, Don’t Sleepwalk into the Cloud – The Challenges
for Law Firms and their Clients, LEGAL WEEK (June 25, 2015), https://www.law.com/legalweek/2015/06/25/dont-sleepwalk-into-the-cloud-the-challenges-for-law-firms-and-theirclients-2/ [https://perma.cc/8AYZ-6UQU]. Although, there appears to be an emerging uptake
of cloud technologies within the profession. See, e.g., ILTA & INSIDELEGAL, 2016
ILTA/INSIDELEGAL TECHNOLOGY PURCHASING SURVEY (2016). Notably, cloud technologies
bring data protection and ethics obligations.
274. For a broad discussion of this IP issue, see Ermert, supra note 209.
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new to the market, rather than new to a firm, with firms tending to
collaborate with non-competitors to develop products with mass market, rather than firm level appeal.275 This removes what might otherwise be seen as an incompatible tension between a firm’s interest in
safeguarding a tool where it bestows a competitive advantage, and a
developer’s interest in selling this tool to a firm’s competitors.
A focus on mass-market products resolves the intellectual property
and competition challenge, yet simultaneously constrains the eco-system for innovation. It suggests an agenda of future development led by
large law firms in the service of large clients and growth of AI in RegTech and corporate law fields rather than access to justice. The latter
being a field where the enthusiasm around AI-based technologies wax
and wane over shorter timescales than longer-term public sector decision-making can accommodate and where data is not always available
in the form (or at the scale) required.
B. Access to Data
The predictive ability of an ML system remains substantially more
dependent on the features selected and data quality/quantity used,
than the algorithm (or statistical model) employed. In certain circumstances, data will be readily available and provided in a format that
lends itself to analysis. Large-scale datasets of U.S. Supreme Court
cases yield a rich source of information prime for analysis and for the
development of related analytical tools. Other publicly available largescale data sets (for example, Enron discovery documents) provide
source material by which to develop and refine new legal software tools,
whilst privately held datasets give rise to collaborations between startup developers and law firms.276 Yet whilst digitization has made certain forms of data abundant, it is not always the sort of data that is
required for the analysis of law.
In contrast to the U.S., which provides Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) for the network of federal courts, open
publishing requirements are often patchy in other jurisdictions. So,
although the U.S. PACER system has come under attack for the high

275. Id.
276. For example, Ross Intelligence utilized Baker Hostetler’s 27 terabyte’s of data pertaining to the Bernard Madoff case to help learn bankruptcy law. Ross Intelligence, ROSS
Intelligence Announces Partnership with BakerHostetler, PRNEWSWIRE (May 5, 2016),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ross-intelligence-announces-partnership-withbakerhostetler-300264039.html [https://perma.cc/35DC-57KF]. It should be noted that much
of the publicity surrounding Ross Intelligence reported that the firm was “hiring” technology,
implying that the system came ready-made. Id. In a reality, Ross Intelligence approached
Baker Hostetler at an early stage in development knowing that the firm had a large amount
of bankruptcy data, with a view to having the firm trial the product to develop the system’s
understanding and knowledge of bankruptcy law. Id.
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costs of access and a range of other inadequacies,277 proponents of the
open data movement in the U.S. have increasingly made inroads into
democratizing access in a way not achieved elsewhere.278 In England
and Wales for example, there exists a highly fragmented data environment in which the publication of legal decisions has been privatized
since inception, with “law reporters and publishers tak[ing] the view
that the copy of the judge's text which they hold is their intellectual
property.” 279 As such, the work of bringing together and providing free
and open access to legal judgments has been left to charitable organizations, such as the British and Irish Legal Information Institute
(BAILII).280 Even taking into account resources such as PACER in the
U.S., BAILII in the U.K., or the Australian equivalent (AUSTLII),281
we observe less effort directed towards preserving or making accessible a whole range of potentially useful data collected by public agencies,
including e-bundles and administrative data.
The availability of public data is just one dimension of the data
challenge. Law firms may hold a whole range of business intelligence,
including contracts, legal briefs, legal research, emails, and/or correspondence that can be mined for insights. However, this data is often
held over a number of different jurisdictions (each with their own
data protection laws), a number of different systems (current and
legacy), and firms may impose different data storage systems across
different practice areas or locations.282 From this emerges a series of
unanswered questions regarding the extent to which emerging AI
technologies will be able to handle siloed data in a way that integrates
it more efficiently than the current data pipeline process demands.283
It is not just the availability of data that is important, but also the
form it takes. The use of ML on non-numerical data, such as natural
277. Jeff Roberts, Why the Federal Court Record System PACER is so Broken, and How
to Fix it, GIGADOM (Aug. 27, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/08/27/why-the-federal-courtrecord-system-pacer-is-so-broken-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/T749-DNHR].
278. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 31, at 1361.
279. Philip Leith & Cynthia Fellows, Enabling Free On-line Access to UK Law Reports:
The Copyright Problem, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH 72, 80 (2010).
280. British and Irish Legal Information Institute, BAILII, https://www.bailii.org/
[https://perma.cc/BBH6-2SPR].
285. About, AUSTRALIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.austlii.edu.au/
about.html [https://perma.cc/JF9K-QE52].
282. See, e.g., The Future Architecture of Law Firm Information: A New Foundation for
Information Exchange, HUBBARD ONE & THOMSON REUTERS, https://legalsupportnetwork.
co.uk/sites/default/files/HubbardOne_Whitepaper_OneViewFINAL_0811.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6CQ-SFR2].
283. See, e.g., Ignacio Terrizzano et al., Data Wrangling: The Challenging Journey from
the Wild to the Lake, in 7TH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE DATA SYSTEMS
RESEARCH (CIDR ’15) 4, 4–5 (2015); Alon Halevy et al., Managing Google’s Data Lake: An
Overview of the GOODS System, 39 BULL. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON DATA ENGINEERING 5–
14 (2016).
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language, requires both an understanding of linguistics as well as
massive amounts of training data to infer relationships between entities. It is not difficult to tag a word as a verb or a phrase as passive,
but higher-level relationships that are inherent in understanding law
require exponentially larger volumes of appropriately (i.e., human)
annotated data as well as very sophisticated NLP algorithms.284 For
this reason, associating sentiment with certain word phrases will
require fewer training examples as compared to ingesting legalese,
suggesting appropriate prior cases, or summarizing an internal narrative and establishing a causal relationship. Most NLP systems remain
largely context-specific, and do not generalize well to bodies of text
that differ in nature to the training data—both subject matter and
temporal considerations are relevant. 285 It has previously been observed that because many NLP tools are trained on data that is now
more than 20 years old, they exhibit superior performance for text
written by older users.286 This is of particular relevance to law, given
that frequent comparison is made between historical and modern texts.
These challenges belie some of the limitations seen in previous
studies and discussed at various points in the preceding sections, notably: the development of models based on very small training sets,287

284. Ramon F. Astudillo et al., Learning Word Representations from Scarce and Noisy
Data with Embedding Sub-spaces, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS AND THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL JOINT
CONFERENCE ON NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 1074, 1074 (2015) (“The success of supervised systems largely depends on the amount and quality of the available training data,
oftentimes, even more than the particular choice of learning algorithm (Banko and Brill,
2001). Labeled data is, however, expensive to obtain, while unlabeled data is widely available”). See also Tomas Mikolov et al., Efficient Estimation of Word Representations in Vector
Space, CORNELL U. ARXIV (2013), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.3781.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2VZH-9JQ8]; Kirk Roberts, Assessing the Corpus Size vs. Similarity Trade-off for Word
Embeddings in Clinical NLP, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLINICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING WORKSHOP 54–63 (2016).
285. See, e.g., Allyson Ettinger et al., Towards Linguistically Generalizable NLP Systems:
A Workshop and Shared Task, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORKSHOP ON BUILDING
LINGUISTICALLY GENERALIZABLE NLP SYSTEMS 1 (2017); Ana Marasović, NLP’s generalization problem, and how researchers are tackling it, GRADIENT (Aug. 22, 2018), https://thegradient.pub/frontiers-of-generalization-in-natural-language-processing/ [https://perma.cc/GR32VJB8].
286. Dirk Hovy & Anders Søgaard, Tagging Performance Correlates with Author Age, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS AND THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING 483, 487 (2015).
287. See, e.g., Bochereau et al., supra note 102, at 90. This paper uses what would be
considered in contemporary research an extremely small number of examples (378) when
training their model to discriminate between annulled and confirmed cases, particularly in
the context of the number of inputs they use. Id. Though this may reflect the lack of digitized
data available for training such algorithms in the early 1990s, as well as to a lesser extent
the computational power and ipso facto the time it would have taken to train the neural
network they employ.
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the use of hypothetical data to simulate real cases,288 and the use of
data that reflects only part of the phenomenon under observation.289
Court data poses a particular challenge, not only because published
decisions are difficult to acquire, but also because any attempt to predict certain outcomes, such as court decisions, requires more than just
data from the court of interest. Cases that reach the upper courts are
distinct in nature. This poses fewer problems if the intention of a statistical, ML, or data mining task is simply to look at cases that reach
a particular higher court. However, if the intention is to understand
which cases reach a court and how they differ from cases that do not
progress as far, then the dataset must include cases from lower
courts.290 This means any model produced using this data set is heavily
conditioned on the fact that an applicant has progressed this far, rendering such findings less relevant for people at earlier stages of the
process.291 The same issues arise with respect to precedent versus common cases. Law relies on precedent, but this is reflected in the mass of
common cases, the vast majority of which remain unreported.
In circumstances where an appetite for investment and the necessary data is available, a further challenge presents itself in terms of
the availability of the expertise needed to bring ideas to fruition; an
issue we refer to as “the skills gap.”
C. The Skills Gap
Expertise at the intersection of law and technology is a relative rarity.292 In the majority of jurisdictions, lack of exposure to opportunities
to acquire quantitative and technological skills during legal study

288. For an example of use, see Zeleznikow & Stranieri, supra note 12, at 186; for commentary of use, see Hunter, supra note 41, at 59–60.
289. This is the case with any algorithms attempting to predict which cases end up in
court where the only data used is data drawn from case files. In these instances, the absence
of data relating to those cases that do not end up at court is problematic. See, for example,
the impact of the absence of full data in Naomi Burstyner et al., Why Do Some Civil Cases
End Up in A Full Hearing? Formulating Litigation and Process Referral Indicia Through
Text Analysis, 25 J. JUD. ADMIN. 257–95 (2016); see also Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 238.
290. In their work, Chen and Eagel explicitly identify this challenge by acknowledging
that they were only able to investigate data relating to applicants who have made it to the
refugee court system. Chen & Eagel, supra note 88, at 237. Another important issue that
Chen and Eagel explicitly note is how to deal with missing data, with 80% of the cases in
their dataset missing at least one feature. Id. at 238.
291. Capturing the experiences of those who do not make it to court typically require the
use of wide-scale, expensively compiled legal need survey data. See Charles E. Clark &
Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272 (1938)
(the first of these surveys); PASCOE PLEASENCE ET AL., PATHS TO JUSTICE: A PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE ROADMAP (2013) (summary of current surveys and impact).
292. Catrina Denvir, Scaling the Gap: Legal Education and Data Literacy, in
MODERNISING LEGAL EDUCATION 73 (Catrina Denvir ed., 2020).
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culminates in legal AI being relegated to a fringe activity in law
schools.293 Whilst it may not be necessary to have legal, computing,
and quantitative skills in order to make a contribution to research and
development in legal AI, the early domination of the field by logic programmers (residing ostensibly in computer science departments) was
not without criticism. Not because it was impossible for a logician to
understand law, but because it was observed that logic programmers
all too often failed to move beyond their epistemological view of the
world as a computational model resulting in the development of logic
models that did not accord with how law operated in practice.294
The skills gap presents implications for development of the field, as
well validating broader concerns regarding the potential rule of law
impact and appropriateness of the models developed. As data mining
interfaces begin to democratize access to ML techniques, rendering
software more accessible to those without technical expertise, the
ethical risks of data-driven technologies increase. Having data is only
one dimension to solving a complex problem. The inability to explain
patterns can actually be exacerbated when applying ML techniques,
because the process of analysis is divorced from the traditional
scientific method. In law, traditional qualitative analysis provides a
conceptual underpinning that aids quantitative analysis. The data
does not do all the work for us, and what it reveals is only useful (and
only transferrable to other domains) if it is anchored in a broader theory or hypothesis about how certain phenomena operate or interrelate. 295 This disconnect between “measurable data streams and
meaningful explanatory theories to frame the data” is defined as the
“theory-data gap,” it represents “a key barrier to meaningful social and
behavioral modeling,” demanding a “move from purely data-driven
work to theory-informed work” and a need to “tighten the iterative loop
between theory and data analysis.”296 It is a problem common not just
to law, but also to medical applications of AI.297 Moreover, this is not
just an issue in respect of ML-based reasoning systems. As Ashley
noted in respect of analogical reasoning “analogy is a way of stating

293. For a more detailed exposition, see Philip Leith, IT and Law, and Law Schools, 14
INT’L. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 171 (2000).
294. Leith, Fundamental Errors in Legal Logic Programming, supra note 45, at 552.
299. See, e.g., Peter Norvig, All We Want are the Facts, Ma’am, NORVIG.COM,
http://norvig.com/fact-check.html [https://perma.cc/FQ3U-ZSGL].
296. OSOBA & DAVIS, supra note 100, at iii.
297. Whilst methods of statistical, data-centric modeling were not unheard of during the
early stage of medical AI development. See, e.g., J.R. Staniland et al., Clinical Presentation
of Acute Abdomen: Study of 600 Patients, 3 BRITISH MED. J. 393, 394 (1972). They were not
widely applied in part because the biomedical understanding thought necessary to properly
model the underlying processes was lacking. SZOLOVITS, supra note 59, at 6.
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a conclusion, not reaching one, and theory must do the real work,
where theory is the principle that links cases or that separates
them.”298
New variations of ML do not address issues of skills shortage, nor
do they do away with the need for an underlying theoretical conceptualization of the construct that a ML model is attempting to represent.
NLP offers an instrumental case study in this regard. Previous epochs
of NLP have been characterized by great collaboration between
domain specialists (linguists) and computer scientists/AI researchers.
The Cocke-Younger-Kamasi algorithm 299 recognizes whether a
sentence is consistent with a given set of grammatical rules, and
generates a chart (parse tree) to reflect the structure of the
sentence. 300 Notably, this algorithm is informed by grammatical
theory developed by Chomsky 301 as well as efficient computational
techniques developed by Bellman, 302 and is thus a good example of
the interplay between linguistics and computer science. Admittedly,
computer scientists with little linguistic understanding can design
deep-learning algorithms: a word-embedding algorithm can learn the
quantitative representation of the text on which a deep neural network
can be trained. However, throwing data at a problem is only possible
with access to huge training sets (of the type retained by large
technology companies) and more limited training sets are likely to
result in over-fitting and/or increased error/uncertainty. Rather than
giving rise to opportunities for innovation, these pragmatic constraints
implicitly and explicitly shape the role that AI occupies in and outside
of law, and at times, actively militate against innovation.
D. The Shape of AI to Come
It is possible for law to be reflected by AI systems in a variety of
different ways, and continued technological development is likely to
yield further methods by which to model the law and legal reasoning.
Whether or not these systems are designed, developed, and deployed
to benefit the majority or the minority remains to be seen. Legal AI
302. Kevin Ashley et al., Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence: How Computers
“Think” Like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 2, 20 (2001).
299. This algorithm was derived by three researchers independently. See Daniel H.
Younger, Recognition and Parsing of Context-Free Languages in Time n3, 10 INFO. &
CONTROL 189, 189–90 (1967); T. KASAMI, AN EFFICIENT RECOGNITION AND SYNTAX-ANALYSIS
ALGORITHM FOR CONTEXT-FREE LANGUAGES (1966); JOHN COCKE & J.T. SCHWARTZ,
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND THEIR COMPILERS: PRELIMINARY NOTES (1969).
300. Younger, supra note 303, at 189–90; KASAMI, supra note 303; COCKE & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 303.
301. Noam Chomsky, On Certain Formal Properties of Grammars, 2 INFO. & CONTROL
137 (1959).
302. Such as dynamic programming: Richard Ernest Bellman, The Theory of Dynamic
Programming, 60 BULL. AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 503 (1954).
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does not (in and of itself) signal the beginning of a new era of tools
capable of making good on the promise of universal access to justice or
unfailing adherence to the rule of law. As our analysis of the pragmatic
challenges reveal, these objectives cannot be realized without a supporting infrastructure. Nevertheless, given the exponential advances
in data and processing power seen over the last two decades, we are
still at a relatively early stage of data-driven AI development. That
there are few examples to illustrate how the application of AI to law
and the representation of law via AI might enhance the rule of law and
access to justice is not to say that such uses are not possible. Nor is it
the case that in order for one group to gain another group must necessarily lose, even if the conditions steering development in the field tend
to favor private over public interests.
However, safeguarding the rule of law and the protections enshrined in the constitution requires a commitment to using AI in an
ethical and informed manner, guided by a series of values that operate
to minimize risk. Better practice guidelines supporting the development of automated systems intended to apply legislation to determine
an entitlement, offer a starting point as to what considerations ought
to guide deployment. These identify the substance, breadth, structural,
and semantic complexity of the legislation; the remit of the authorizing
agency; the transparency of decisions reached; the grounds for decision
review; privacy; data accuracy; auditing; de-skilling of decision makers;
and the cost of implementation and maintenance as relevant factors.303
Building on these guidelines, we propose emerging legal AI tools are
assessed with reference to the extent to which they:
• Operate to reveal rather than embed bias;
• Promote the accessibility of the legal system;
• Ensure the processes by which outcomes reached are transparent;
• Balance rather than entrench power imbalances between
parties;
• Enhance rather than diminish the intelligibility of legal
language;
• Sustain or improve upon the existing models of due process;
• Distribute benefits;
• Make clear the model of law imposed; and,
•

Benefit from on-going monitoring and refinement.

307. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING WORKING GROUP, AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING
BETTER PRACTICE GUIDE (2007); ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COUNCIL, supra note 164.
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Furthermore, we suggest the need to304:
•

Make the system/algorithm publicly available;

•

Implement independent auditing mechanisms;

•

Publish the data used to train the system;

•

Categorize systems in line with an established algorithmic
risk scale;

•

Inform users where AI has been used in a process or
decision and make clear the inputs that featured in the decision;

•

Make clear who is accountable for any action that arises as
a by-product of the use of the tool; and,

•

Ensure that mechanisms are in place to compensate those
negatively impacted by mistaken decisions.

These suggestions represent the start of a framework for evaluating
AI in law, though the feasibility, practicality, efficacy, and impact of
the suggestions provided will remain a work in progress as technological and regulatory infrastructures continue to evolve. Adequately capturing the full range of philosophical, practical, jurisprudential, democratic, societal, and rule of law implications that may arise as a result
of AI adoption in law, and regulating these risks via appropriate governance structures, remains a critical focus for future research.
V. CONCLUSION
Whilst early AI efforts in the 1980s focused on the development
of expert logic systems in law, as the processing power and storage
capability of computers have grown, so too has the use of data-driven
AI, represented by quantitative and “machine learning” methods.
Studies demonstrate that it is possible to apply ML to a range of legal
tasks, many of which are documented above. In adding to this literature, this paper has considered what potential AI holds as a means by
which to improve the functioning of legal systems, democratize access
to justice and legal services, address latent legal need, protect citizens
from abuses of power, address systemic bias, and promote greater
institutional accountability and transparency. Such questions are
not new, and the implications they pose are the same issues with
which those who create and study the law have always struggled.
Nevertheless, as technology infrastructures continue to evolve,

304. A number of these suggestions were adapted from the work of Copeland. See
Eddie Copeland, 10 Principles for Public Sector use of Algorithmic Decision Making, NESTA
BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/code-of-standards-public-sector-usealgorithmic-decision-making [https://perma.cc/86TM-T5F9].
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increasing in complexity and sophistication and reaching further into
our lives than ever before, these questions demand renewed attention.
This Paper has engaged with many of these questions and the
constitutional and rule of law challenges posed by AI. We have raised
concerns regarding the way in which AI systems impose a particular
theoretical paradigm, limiting space for legal dialectical pluralism. We
have noted a number of challenges relating to the capacity of AI to
subvert the intent and purpose of the law or to fail to reflect the complexity of the expression of law. We have also considered the potential
implications of AI in the context of the rule of law, observing the need
for AI systems to balance a range of competing priorities and questioning their ability to do so. Finally, we have considered the pragmatic
issues that are likely to shape the future of AI development in law,
assessed the implications that these issues pose by reference to the
likely beneficiaries of AI technologies, and offered a range of criteria
that may form the basis of a more well-developed suite of safeguards
that scaffold development in the field.
We conclude by emphasizing that systems capable of creating, interpreting, applying, and enforcing the law requires a transformation
of what we understand as “law.” The vision of law reflected in AI
systems is shaped by the limits of the technology used to create that
vision. Where law (whether represented by interpretation, bargaining,
or enforcement) is transposed into rule-based and data-driven AI systems, nuance is supplanted by simplicity and relational representation
in a manner that can operate to undermine the ends to which law is
directed. Any technological representation of law and the legal obligations it spawns is necessarily bound—and in some instances irrevocably limited—by what the contemporary technology makes possible.
The view of law through the eyes of AI would have been more different
in the 1980s than today, not because the law has fundamentally
changed, but because our ability to express law and legal relationships
via technology has changed.
Law is not just process, rules, sanctions, norms, or behavior. It
ought not reside in the hands of those with the resources or power to
direct a self-serving agenda, but in balancing the interests of many
voices in society. The consequences that arise from any transformation,
whether in the form of: value-added, plurality lost, efficiency gained,
flexibility preserved, costs reduced, profit made, or debate and freedom
safeguarded, are relevant only in so far as they impact upon the
capacity of the law to achieve (and to be seen to achieve) justice. Any
implementation of AI must be able to justify a contribution to that end.
For this reason, legal AI must be evaluated in advance of deployment with reference to a framework that adequately safeguards those
principles enshrined in the constitution and the rule of law. We have
outlined some potential components of such a framework in Part IV,
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though we recognize that not all objectives are equal, or for that matter,
equally achievable. It may be easier to determine the key beneficiaries
of a particular technology than to project a wide range of risks into the
future. Whilst we can never know with certainty what threats might
accompany a particular form of legal AI in advance of deployment, we
see the development of a “rule of legal AI” as an important governance
mechanism guiding future development in the field and suggest
on-going research in order to better illuminate its contours.

